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The public trust doctrine has enjoyed a significant renaissance over the last
twenty-five years as a tool for judicial review of government decisions to
alienate natural resources. The analysis most responsible for the doctrine's
rebirth, Joseph Sax's 1970 Michigan Law Review article, characterizes the
doctrine as a tool for perfecting inadequacies in the political and administrative
process that may result in inappropriate discounting of environmental values.
In this Article, Professor William Araiza considers this democracy-reinforcing
conception of the doctrine by exploring the analogy between it and the political-
process theory of the Equal Protection Clause. This latter theory justifies a
searching judicial scrutiny of legislation burdening certain groups on the
grounds that prejudice limits those groups' ability to participate fully in the
political process. Essentially, Professor Araiza asks whether public trust
resources can be meaningfully analogized to such "discrete and insular minor-
ities," for which heightened judicial protection is appropriate. He concludes
that while it may be theoretically possible to draw this analogy, a process-
justified public trust doctrine nevertheless fails to provide principles limiting that
which would otherwise be an extraordinarily broad scope for judicial review.
Moreover, environmental protection is a politically powerful rallying cry in
contemporary America; when combined with existing mechanisms for chan-
neling that political power into administrative action, this fact undermines the
appropriateness of special judicial solicitude for environmental conservation
based on alleged defects in the government decision-making process.
Professor Araiza consequently rejects a purely process-justified public trust
doctrine and instead considers sources of a substantive political commitment to
public trust preservation. He argues that many state constitutions provide this
commitment through provisions addressing environmental protection. Pro-
fessor Araiza concludes that many of these provisions, carefully read, can pro-
vide the foundation for a public trust doctrine that seeks not to second-guess
government decisions, but that merely attempts to ensure that environmental
values are appropriately considered in the decision-making process. This con-
clusion both gives effect to these provisions, most of which have laid dormant
since their enactment, and limits the judicial role in areas in which the need for
technical expertise and political accountability make judicial policy making
especially inappropriate.
INTRODUCTION
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a remarkable renaissance of
the public trust doctrine. That doctrine, traceable to a Roman legal prin-
ciple governing the public's right to use certain resources as a commons,'
1. See infra Part I.A.
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has found new life in American law as a source of judicial authority to
supervise and sometimes limit the use of natural resources, usually' favoring
resource preservation. The rebirth of the public trust doctrine is directly
attributable to the publication of Joseph Sax's seminal 1970 article' calling
attention to the doctrine, finding it already reflected in contemporary
American law, and lauding its use as a tool for judicial supervision of
resource-allocation decisions made by government.4 Since the publication
of Sax's article, many courts have relied on the doctrine to impose limits
both on the government's ability to alienate natural resources, and on the
government's and private owners' ability to use such resources in ways
deemed incompatible with the public trust with which the resource was
found to be impressed.'
While many commentators have applauded this trend and suggested
ways to expand the doctrine's scope, 6 others have not reacted as favorably.
Radical critiques have argued that the ascendancy of the public trust doc-
trine preempted the debate about the future of society's relationship to the
2. The original conception of the doctrine protected the public's ability to use public trust
resources for fishing, navigation, and commerce. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L.
REv. 631, 647 (1986). While modem American courts generally use the doctrine to protect
recreational and conservation interests, courts have also relied on its commerce-promoting aim.
See, e.g., Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979) (holding that the
use of water resources for airport expansion is consistent with the doctrine); id. at 716 (Bryson,
J., concurring) (reasoning that airport expansion is consistent with the public trust doctrine
because it promotes commerce and possible air "navigation"). Sometimes, however, recreational
and preservation uses do not coincide, such as when the choice is between creating or increasing
public access to an area that has remained in its natural state. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX,
MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980).
3. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29 (Cal. 1983)
(reasoning that the public trust doctrine requires a state to consider resource conservation
interests when allocating water rights); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (holding that the public trust doctrine limits a state's
authority to alienate public lands); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976) (noting that the public trust
doctrine requires a state to engage in comprehensive water resource planning). For a
comprehensive listing of cases employing the public trust doctrine, see Lazarus, supra note 2, at
644 n.77.
6. See, e.g., Michael Graf, Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Achieve Proportionate Reduc-
tions of Water Diversions from the Delta, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 263, 290-95 (1995);
Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of
Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989); Susan D. Baer, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool to
Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 385 (1988).
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natural world-a debate that some believe was, in 1970, on the verge of
producing new and farther-reaching legal and social changes Other scho-
lars have suggested that any usefulness the doctrine may have had when
Sax's article was published has since expired with the growing public
awareness of environmental concerns and the resulting enactment of
environmental protection legislation at the state, federal, and international
levels." Commentators have also criticized the doctrine on the grounds
that its vagueness and potential scope threaten efficient resource-allocation
decision making and involve democratically unaccountable judges in
resource-allocation decisions that should be made by more representative
branches of government.
This Article considers this latter critique of the public trust doctrine.
Specifically, it examines whether the discretion the doctrine bestows on
7. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform,
44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1220-27 (1991) (arguing that the appearance of the public trust doc-
trine argument in the early 1970s effectively precluded consideration of earth-centered, Native
American-based, and ecological-feminism approaches to environmentalism).
8. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 631 ("The last fifteen years [1970-19851 have wit-
nessed a fantastic effort to develop a framework of legal rules reflecting this nation's increased
awareness of the adverse impacts of environmental pollution and degradation."). At the federal
level, for example, the 1970s witnessed the enactment of an enormous quantity of federal statu-
tory law seeking to protect the environment. Among the more significant federal environmental
statutes enacted or substantially strengthened during the late 1960s and 1970s are the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (West Supp. 1997), the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1994), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994), the Safe Drinking Water Act, codified at various parts of 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f-300j (West
Supp. 1997), the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1994), the Solid
Waste Disposal Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992 (1994), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
The 1970s also saw the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, in 1970. During
this period, states also enacted a variety of statutes dealing with pollution prevention and natural
resource conservation. See, e.g., Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution of the Conflict Between
Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
241, 243-44 (1990) (noting the enactment of state environmental laws in the 1970s and 1980s);
Laurie Morissette & Lieutenant Colonel Laurent R. Hourcle, State Environmental Laws Redefine
Substantial and Meaningful Involvement, 31 A.F. L. REV. 137, 137 (1989) (noting state legislative
activity in the hazardous-waste field during the 1980s). Finally, this period witnessed the enact-
ment of a number of international agreements dealing with environmental protection. See, e.g.,
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for
signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403
(dealing with ocean dumping).
The argument that this heightened legislative interest in environmental protection renders
the public trust doctrine outdated is made most cogently by Lazarus, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 239 (1992); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 710-15.
Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust
courts and the "countermajoritarian difficulty"' that such discretion
implies can be mitigated by conceptualizing the doctrine as analogous to
the political-process approach to the Equal Protection Clause."
This approach is traceable to the now-famous footnote four of the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products," in which
Justice Stone suggested that there remained a place for stringent judicial
review of legislation even in the face of the Court's then-recent retreat in
its battle over the New Deal. In Justice Stone's formulation, the Court
retained such a role in four situations: first, when a statute "appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution;', second,
when a statute "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation;"'4 third, in the
case of "statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial
minorities;"'" and fourth, in cases of "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities. ,
16
Scholars, most notably John Hart Ely, argue that footnote four can be
best understood as the post-Lochner" Court's attempt to find a role for
judicial review within a democracy by focusing on the clearing of channels
by which citizens exercise political power."' Whether these channels are
clogged by laws that directly impede political activity-for example, by
restricting expression or voting rights (the second Carolene situation)-or
that disadvantage particular groups of citizens in ways indicating their de
facto disenfranchisement (Carolene's third and fourth situations), scholars
such as Ely argue that judicial review of this sort does not conflict with the
10. The phrase is Alexander Bickel's. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.").
12. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
16. Id.
17. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York statute mandat-
ing maximum working hours for bakers as a violation of due process liberty of contract). Lochner
has become a shorthand for the Supreme Court's practice, lasting from the end of the nineteenth
century until 1937, of carefully reviewing state and federal social and economic regulations for
possible violations of individuals' freedom to participate in economic life. The Supreme Court's
abandonment and repudiation of this practice is well documented. See, e.g., LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574-81 (2d ed. 1988).
18. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980). Even scholars who question footnote four's relevance today accept this reading of its
genesis. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
713 (1985).
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idea of democratic government, but in fact reinforces it by ensuring that
the democratic process is indeed democratic-that is, open to all.
This process-based theory of equal protection finds distinct echoes in
explanations of the modern public trust doctrine. The doctrine, at least in
its modern incarnation as explained by Sax, is designed to respond to the
problem of resource-allocation decision making skewed by what Sax
describes as "perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
process."' 9 In his article, Sax identifies two sources of such "imperfect"
decisions and suggests carefully tailored judicial remedies. The first
systemic defect is decision making at an inappropriate level of government,
resulting in a lack of consideration of important resource-conservation
interests.'O Sax's discussion makes clear that he considers the problem to
be decision making at too local a level, with the result that the more
broadly distributed benefits of conserving a public use of the resource are
undervalued relative to the (usually economic) benefits of alienating the
resource. A classic example is a local government's decision to allow the
development of a wetland that provides benefits (such as flood control and
wildlife habitat) for a much broader population. In response to this prob-
lem, Sax cites and applauds a line of Wisconsin cases requiring that deci-
sions adversely affecting public trust interests be made at a larger
governmental level-for instance, by the state instead of a county or city."
The second process defect Sax discusses is the phenomenon of allo-
cation decisions he characterizes as "low-visibility," such as those made by
an administrative agency or by means of a governmental grant of a land
title to a private party. According to Sax, the relative invisibility of such'
decisions means that they do not attract the notoriety necessary to inform
and energize the general public, whose interests these decisions may harm.
To illustrate the point, Sax relies primarily on a series of Massachusetts
cases dealing with decisions by state agencies to transfer control of a public
trust resource to either a private party or another governmental agency
desiring the resource for a non-public trust use." As with the Wisconsin
cases, the Massachusetts courts did not flatly prohibit the proposed action;
instead, they required explicit legislative authorization for the agency to
make the transfer.23 Sax explains these cases in process terms, arguing that
the requirement of express legislative authorization would put the people's
19. Sax, suprra note 3, at 509.
20. See id. at 521-23.
21. See id. at 509-23.
22. See id. at 491-502.
23. See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969).
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representatives on notice of the public trust implications of such a transfer,
with the result that the beneficiaries of the trust-the people-could exert
political pressure to safeguard the resource."
Sax's description of these two sets of case law suggests a parallel
between them and the political-process theory of the Equal Protection
Clause. Just as these types of public trust cases reflect judicial concern with
governmental action taken without appropriate regard to public trust inter-
ests, so too the doctrine of strict scrutiny attempts to compensate for
defects in the political process that result in disfavored groups being
disadvantaged without good reason. However, it should be noted, even at
this introductory point, that there is an important difference between the
two doctrines-namely, the type of remedy. The public trust doctrine
reflected in Sax's article attempts to redress a process defect through a proc-
ess remedy-for example, the requirement of explicit legislative author-
ization for decisions impairing public trust resources. By contrast, equal
protection doctrine normally attempts to guard the integrity of the political
process through the substantive remedy of invalidation of laws that do not
meet the strict scrutiny standard. Nevertheless, the resemblance between
the public trust doctrine and Ely's vision of the Equal Protection Clause
remains striking, if so far only at a distance.
This resemblance raises the question of whether the analogy can be
taken further. Specifically, if both the public trust doctrine and process-
based equal protection theory respond to the same concern about the
legitimacy of judicial review, and if both do so by attempting to present
judicial review as representation-reinforcing, as opposed to representation-
defeating, can the former be legitimized by the same rationale underlying
the latter? Or are the differences between the two doctrines simply too
great for one to give meaningful insight into the other? Moreover, if a
parallel does exist, do problems inherent in equal protection process theory
also infect the public trust doctrine? Finally, if equal protection theory fails
in some way to provide a basis for special judicial solicitude for public trust
resources, is there any other place to look for such a justification? These
are the questions this Article attempts to answer.
Part I of the Article provides the necessary background. It begins with
a brief history of the public trust doctrine and then reviews the current
state of the doctrine in American courts. This review focuses on two par-
ticular issues that have been the focus of much of the current criticism of
the doctrine: the expansion of the types of resources that have come under
24. Sax also mentions California cases as illustrative of this point. See Sax, supra note 3,
at 524-45.
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the doctrine's protection, and the type of review courts perform over the
decisions of other governmental branches. In brief, critics of the modern
public trust doctrine argue that the scope of resources coming under its pro-
tection has expanded beyond all relation to the doctrine's historical focus
on water-based resources, and that judicial review under the doctrine has
usurped the role appropriately played by the political branches of govern-
ment. Part I closes by reviewing these criticisms, thus setting the stage for
the examination of whether process-based equal protection theory may
help to answer them.
Part II of the Article continues the theme of critiques of judicial
review, but discusses those critiques in the context of equal protection
jurisprudence. It begins by examining the theory of judicial review implicit
in footnote four. It pays special attention to Ely's development of that
theory in his book Democracy and Distrust.2" Specifically, Part II examines
how process-based equal protection theory deals with the three questions
most prominently mentioned in critiques of the public trust doctrine: first,
how can judicial review of legislation be justified in a democracy? (the
"countermajoritarian problem"); second, how should a court decide which
groups deserve heightened judicial solicitude? (the "suspect class prob-
lem"); and, finally, how should the suspect class analysis change when a
previously suspect class begins to become the beneficiary, rather than the
victim, of legislation? (the "political success problem").26
Part II first discusses the countermajoritarian problem. That problem
is easily answered by process theorists who argue that process-justified
review in fact reinforces democracy by "clearing the channels of politica
change" or "facilitating the representation of minorities.""7 But that justi-
fication highlights a major difference between the situation described by
process theorists and the public trust context: while process-based theory
assumes the existence of humans, or human groups, the public trust con-
text, as conceptualized in this Article, deals with the public trust resources
25. ELY, supra note 18.
26. The "political success problem" also speaks, if indirectly, to commentators' suggestions
that the public trust doctrine may have outlived its usefulness in light of the growing body of
statutory environmental protection. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
It is important to note at this point that this Article limits its focus to governmental deci-
sion making at the administrative level, rather than at the legislative level. Because most gov-
ernment decisions that impair a particular trust resource are made at the administrative level, the
focus on administrative action allows analysis of most trust-impairing decisions while avoiding
the extra complexities that arise when contemplating judicial review of legislative enactments.
27. These phrases are taken from the titles of chapters 5 and 6, respectively, of Democracy
and Distrust-the two chapters that present Ely's process-justified theory of judicial review. See
ELY, supra note 18.
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themselves. At one level, this difference does not pose insuperable bar-
riers: human. representatives can legitimately provide stand-in rep-
resentation for such resources, consistent with constitutional jurisprudence
in other fields in which process defect claims have been rejected based on
such virtual representation.
This anthropomorphism issue does, however, present a more serious
problem when considering the second question: the criteria for identifying
a group as a suspect class. The problem arises because political-process
theory assumes human participation in a political process (or, if there is a
process defect, an impediment to such participation). The traditional
indicia of suspect class status--discreteness, insularity, and a history of dis-
crimination-simply do not apply to public trust resources. How can
public trust resources be thought of as a suspect class? A possible answer to
this question is based on Ely's idea that the suspect class inquiry turns in
large part on the "empathy" that a legislature may feel for a class. Ely
suggests that such empathy reduces the likelihood that laws will be based
on inaccurate, derogatory stereotypes (which, in turn, suggest the
intentional discrimination Ely finds to be the fundamental target of the
equal protection guarantee). The concept of empathy can be transferred,
while retaining its basic insight, into governmental (and especially
administrative) decisions affecting public trust resources. By examining
the structure by which government makes such decisions, courts can
determine whether there is "bureaucratic empathy" for public trust
resources-that is, whether the decision-making process is structured so as
to ensure governmental consideration of the value of resources as public
trust property.
The problem with this harmonization of classic process theory and its
public trust analogue is that it proves too much: under this theory, courts
would be justified whenever a supposed defect in the political or admin-
istrative process caused the decisionmaker systematically to undervalue a
particular consideration (for example, trust resource conservation). Such a
conclusion is at least troubling, as it implies a revolutionary change in the
relationship between courts and the other branches of government, to the
detriment of politically accountable and technically expert branches and
the aggrandizement of nonelected and technically inexpert courts. Is there
something unique about public trust resources that justifies special judicial
solicitude for them while not simultaneously justifying searching judicial
review of all administrative action?
Part II concludes that process theory provides no good answer to this
last question. In a well-functioning political process, minorities should lose
UCLA LAW REVIEW 385 (1997)
a significant number of battles; conversely, occasional success clearly
should not mean that a minority is no longer systematically disadvantaged
and thus not eligible for process-justified protection. The problem of
political success is especially relevant in the public trust context, in which
the environment, if not a sure political winner, is at least potent enough to
command the attention of politicians at all levels of government. The lack
of a satisfying answer to this "political success problem" reinforces the
conclusion that stringent judicial review of governmental action affecting
public trust resources cannot be a response to a pure process defect.
Instead, such stringent judicial review must result from a substantive politi-
cal commitment to public trust resource protection.
Part III addresses the concern about substantive values. It distills the
principal conclusion reached above-namely, that justifying judicial scru-
tiny of trust-impairing decisions on a general idea that government often
fails adequately to consider such resources would amount to a radical
change in judicial review of legislative and administrative action. More-
over, absent such a substantive commitment to environmental protection,
this change lacks an obvious limiting principle. Simply put, if the
justification for heightened scrutiny is political-process failure, then an
enormously broad range of governmental action would be susceptible to
such scrutiny, depending on courts' conclusions that some vague test of
process failure had been satisfied.
In response to this concern, Part III considers whether Carol Rose's
idea of "inherently public property" provides a justification for this judicial
review, by identifying a principled basis on which courts could exercise this
review. Rose examines the fact that nineteenth-century American courts
embraced doctrines under which certain property was deemed owned by
the public, not as government property but as held by the public at large.
Rose explains that courts' willingness to embrace such doctrines, even
during the nineteenth-century exaltation of private property, was based on
an understanding that certain property was most valuable as such inher-
ently public property. Her analysis suggests that such judicial calculation
might serve as the substantive basis for a doctrine giving special protection
for public trust resources today. However, even Rose's idea remains vul-
nerable to the charge that it provides a blank check for judicial scrutiny of
governmental action based on vague and manipulable criteria. For there to
be a legitimate, discrete justification for judicial review based on the proc-
28. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
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ess analysis outlined in this Article, some substantive commitment to trust
resource preservation must be found.
Part IV suggests that this commitment can be found in state con-
stitutional provisions dealing with the environment. These provisions
have been plagued by courts' hesitation to construe them as imposing limits
on governmental action, largely due to concern about both the vagueness
of the provisions and judicial competence to evaluate difficult social policy
decisions affecting the environment. By construing these constitutional
provisions as mechanisms for responding to a process-based problem, and
by deploying against that problem a process-based remedy requiring gov-
ernment to consider environmental interests when making environmental
decisions, this Article provides content to these provisions that is ana-
lytically coherent and appropriate for judicial enforcement, and that gives
effect to the unquestionable, if vaguely expressed, will of the polity that
government accord a high value to public trust conservation.
1. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Public Trust Doctrine from Justinian to Sax 9
The modern public trust doctrine traces its origins to Byzantine law-
specifically, the Justinian Code's statement that "By natural law, these
things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it
the shores of the sea."'3 It is unclear whether this principle represented
actual Byzantine practice or merely an aspiration.31 Regardless of its actual
legal force in the Byzantine Empire, the principle eventually found its way
into the codified or customary law of most medieval European legal sys-
tems,32 including England's."
29. This Article provides only the barest outline of the early history of the public trust doc-
trine. For more in-depth treatments, see MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE
BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1789-
1920 (1987); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762, 763-68 (1970) (discussing the Roman-law origins of doctrine).
30. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1, pts. 1-6, at 65 (J. Thomas trans., 1975).
31. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633-34 (noting that the statement probably repre-
sented Justinian's idealization of a legal regime).
32. See, e.g., id. (noting that the principle was reflected in medieval Spanish codes and the
customary law of most European legal systems); see also Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1980) (observing that the
principle was reflected in medieval French customary law).
33. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 635 (commenting that the principle was reflected in
Bracton's thirteenth-century legal commentary).
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From England, the public trust principle became part of American
common law. As early as 1821, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Arnold
v. Mundy, 4 used the term "public trust" in the course of stating a rule limit-
ing a private party's capacity to own water-related resources. However, the
unquestionable fountainhead of the American public trust doctrine was the
Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois."
That case concerned an attempt by the Illinois legislature to rescind its
earlier grant to the railroad of most of the land along the Chicago water-
front. The Court ruled in favor of the state, concluding that the original
grant was void because the state did not have the power to alienate prop-
erty in which the public had a trust interest for purposes such as navigation
and fishing. The doctrinal basis for this conclusion is unclear, as the
Court's opinion cited no authority for its conclusion.36 Decades later, the
Court described the case as involving merely a matter of Illinois law,37 a
strange conclusion since if that had been the case, the state legislature's
grant presumably would have superseded any common law prohibitions on
such transfers."
Despite the vagueness of the support for the Court's holding, the
Illinois Central decision became the basis for state court 9 decisions employ-
ing the public trust doctrine. In the decades following Illinois Central, a
34. 6 N.J.L. 1, 71-78 (1821) (restricting a private party's ability to own oyster beds sub-
merged in river).
35. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
36. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 28, at 737 (describing this part of the opinion as "remarkably
free of supporting authority").
37. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
38. The Illinois legislature lacked the power to legislate in a way that violated the state
constitution, but the Illinois Central Court gave no indication that its decision was based on the
Illinois Constitution. Cf. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions:
The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 877 (1996) (describing the
public trust doctrine as "a curious and unique hybrid, borne purely of customary law but constitu-
tional in character").
39. There is great uncertainty about whether the public trust doctrine is based on state or
federal law. Compare Appleby, 271 U.S. at 395 (stating that the Illinois Central decision was based
on state law), and Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Manage-
ment in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 548-51 (1992) (stating that the public trust
doctrine is primarily a state-law doctrine), with Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Pub-
lic Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 425
& n. I (1989) (noting that the public trust "doctrine" comprises 50 state-law doctrines and a fed-
eral-law doctrine), and Michael L. Wolz, Comment, Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine to the
Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It Fill the Statutory Gaps?, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 483-
84 (1992) (explaining that it is unclear whether the public trust doctrine is based on federal or
state law). Regardless of its basis, state courts have been the most active in enforcing the doc-
trine. See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 644 n.77 (listing cases).
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number of courts, especially in Wisconsin and Florida,4 held that the
public enjoyed rights in various types of waterways, which served to limit
the legislature's ability to alienate those resources. The Wisconsin deci-
sions established especially strict limitations on the legislature's police
power. One opinion, for example, questioned the state's police power to
authorize the conversion of a stream into agricultural fields, regardless of
the benefits the public might thereby enjoy." Even the cases that did not
go this far nevertheless established the basic principle that the public holds
rights in certain water resources that limit the power of legislative rep-
resentatives to alienate such resources. These cases provided the back-
ground for Sax's 1970 exposition and advocacy of the doctrine in the
service of not just fishing and navigation, but an entirely new objective:
environmental preservation.
43
B. Sax's Vision of the Public Trust Doctrine
Sax's 1970 article on the public trust doctrine 44 is generally con-
sidered-by both detractors" and admirers 46-to be the catalyst behind the
doctrine's modern revival. His article, however, is less a call for an entirely
new way of thinking about the public trust doctrine as it is an attempt to
find common themes in already-existing doctrines courts had developed.
Sax focuses primarily on existing case law in an attempt to show that courts
have played and could continue to play a legitimate role in natural resource
decision making. Sax views that role fundamentally as one of process, not
40. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927); In re Crawford
County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924); In re Trempealeau Drainage
Dist., 131 N.W. 838 (Wis. 1911); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W.
918 (Wis. 1896).
41. See, e.g., Adams v. Elliott, 174 So. 731 (Fla. 1937); Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 151
So. 892 (Fla. 1934); Trumbull v. McIntosh, 138 So. 34 (Fla. 1931); Freed v. Miami Beach Pier
Corp., 112 So. 841 (Fla. 1927); Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927); Apalachicola Land &
Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505 (Fla. 1923); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47 So. 353 (Fla. 1908);
State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640 (Fla. 1893).
42. See Crawford County, 196 N.W. at 878 ("[l~t does not lie within the power ... of the
state to change navigable waters into agricultural fields, no matter how great the public benefits
might be in favor of the latter.").
43. In addition to fishing and navigation, courts as early as the late-nineteenth century had
begun to recognize recreation as a public trust use. See Rose, supra note 28, at 757 n.225.
44. See Sax, supra note 3.
45. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 7, at 1211; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 632 (describing Sax's
article as "seminal").
46. See, e.g., Baer, sura note 6, at 392 ("The public trust doctrine languished somewhat in
the early twentieth century. It was not until Joseph Sax's seminal and oft-quoted 1970 article
that the doctrine was actively incorporated into modern jurisprudence.").
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substance: "public trust law," he says, "is not so much a substantive set of
standards for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by which
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and admin-
istrative process."4 In the next sentence, Sax makes his vision even more
explicit: "the public trust concept is, more than anything else, a medium
for democratization. 48
Sax supports his claim by discussing existing case law, primarily from
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California. According to Sax, the public
trust cases in these states reflect different ways in which the doctrine can
correct "imperfections" in governmental natural resource decision making.
Sax first discusses a line of Massachusetts cases from the 1950s and 1960s
dealing with attempts by state agencies, acting under extremely broad
statutory mandates, either to alienate a public trust resource to private use
or to convert it from a public preservation use to another public use
(usually, a highway) that did not further preservation goals. In these situa-
tions, Massachusetts courts adopted a principle requiring explicit legislative
authorization before state agencies could so proceed. In one case, in which
the agency's statutory authorization was quite explicit, the court went so far
as to require the legislature to insert in the authorizing statute a recital that
it was aware of the existing public use of the land the agency was trying to
convert to a non-public trust purpose.9
Sax finds in these cases a judicial concern for "low visibility decision
making,"50 which he characterizes as a situation in which important
resource-allocation decisions are made without a great deal of publicity or
official notice. Without such notice, the public is not alerted and thus its
interests are often not heard or considered.5 With the problem so con-
ceived, the solution embraced by the Massachusetts courts logically follows:
require the legislature to give explicit approval to public trust-impairing
projects, even to the point of requiring the legislature explicitly to
acknowledge the existence of the threatened trust use. Compliance with
this requirement will, in turn, place the public on notice of the threat to its
interests; if it values the resource highly enough, it will exert political pres-
sure to preserve the resource.
47. Sax, supra note 3, at 509; see also id. at 521 ("The 'public trust' has no life of its own
and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns
about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.").
48. Id. at 509.
49. See Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969).
50. Sax, supra note 3, at 498.
51. See id. at 496-98.
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Sax next discusses several Wisconsin cases. In most of these cases,
state transfers of public land to a private party were challenged on the
ground that the land was impressed with a public trust use, which the pro-
posed grantee would impair or destroy. Wisconsin courts, in a series of
cases starting in 1896, refused to accord broad deference either to the state
agency's, or even the state legislature's, recital of a public purpose under-
lying the grant. For example, in the first of these cases, Priewe v. Wisconsin
State Land and Improvement Co.,5 the legislature attempted to grant a pri-
vate party title to a lake bed, along with permission to drain the lake. The
court refused to allow the transfer, however, holding that the statute was
invalid because it was for "private purposes, and for the sole benefit of pri-
vate parties. '"" The court reached this conclusion even in the face of a
statutory finding that drainage was required for public health.54 In another
case of this type, the court suggested that there might be an absolute pro-
hibition on legislative alienation of certain public resources. In In re
Crawford County Levee & Drainage District No. ,5 the court refused to
allow the implementation of a state commission's drainage plan, focusing
on the conclusion of a commission report, which stated that "public rights
of trapping, hunting, fishing, and navigation will, by no means, be wholly
destroyed."56 The court deduced from the report's use of the word "wholly"
that some trapping, hunting, fishing, and/or navigation rights would be
destroyed and refused to allow that result, holding that "it does not lie
within the power of... the state to change navigable waters into agri-
cultural fields, no matter how great the public benefits might be in favor of
the latter."' ? From these cases, and others that employ a somewhat more
deferential attitude toward legislative decisions, s Sax distills the following
conclusion:
[The Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinions], sensitively read, can be
taken as a form of notice to the legislature and the agencies that
when the public interest of a project is unclear, its proponents will
have the burden of justifying the project and will not be allowed to
rely on traditional presumptions of legislative propriety or admin-
istrative discretion. In adopting this position, the court does not
52. 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896).
53. Id. at 922.
54. See id.
55. 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924).
56. Id. at875.
57. Id. at 878.
58. According to Sax, the Wisconsin courts ultimately developed a five-factor test for
judging public trust challenges to government land-use decisions. See Sax, supra note 3, at 517.
seek a confrontation with the legislature nor does it attempt to sub-
stitute itself as an ultimate judge of the public good. Rather, it tries
to identify and correct those situations in which it is most likely that
there has been an inequality of access to, and influence with, deci-
sion makers so that there is a grave danger that the democratic proc-
esses are not working effectively.
59
Thus, Sax attempts to square the court's substantive review with his
own process-based vision of the public trust doctrine as a democratizing
tool. Closer to this process-based vision are two more recent Wisconsin60.
cases in which the court, rather than reviewing the substance of the
state's action, instead required that the decision be made at a different level
of government. In these cases, the court denied local government units
from taking action affecting water-related resources such as lakes or rivers.
While the opinions themselves do not make the process rationale com-
61pletely clear, Sax interprets them as reflecting a concern that allowing
resource-impairing decisions to be made at an inappropriately local level
would allow localized interests to make decisions affecting resources in
which the larger public-in these cases, the entire state-had an interest.
These decisions did not merely represent judicially crafted limits on local
government; in one case, for example, the court held unconstitutional the
legislature's attempt to delegate such decision-making power to local gov-62
ernments. Regardless of the level of government thereby restrained, the
point remains that Sax views these cases as responding to perceived defects
in the political process. Thus, for instance, he characterized the non-
delegation opinion as "requir[ing] the legislature to respond to a statewide
constituency-another form of judicially imposed democratization."6
The final set of cases Sax considers in detail arose in California. The
California cases do not fit into categories as tidy as those describing
Massachusetts and Wisconsin case law. Nevertheless, his discussion sug-
59. Id. at 514.
60. See City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1959); Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, reh'g granted, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952); see also Sax, supra note 3, at
521-23 (discussing these two cases).
61. The closest any of these opinions seems to come to discussing such a rationale is the
court's second opinion in Muench, in which the court expressed concern that the delegation to a
local government unit of the power to impair a trust resource would make it impossible for the
state to carry out its duty to protect the public trust. See Muench, 55 N.W.2d at 46.
62. See Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 514.
63. Sax, supra note 3, at 523; see also id. at 531-34 (discussing an analogous situation in
California and again concluding that a statewide entity should make decisions affecting public
trust resources in order to guard against "the potential disjunction between the perceived benefit
to the local entity and the total impact of such local choices on the community of (public trust
resource] users as a whole").
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gests that, as of 1970,64 California law limited the ability of both private
and government landowners to use public trust property inconsistently
with public trust purposes. For example, the legislature could authorize a
grantee of state tidelands (whether a private party6 or a municipality66) to
develop the property only in the aid of a use, such as commerce, consistent
with the public trust. At the level of the state's own use of such resources,
Sax concludes that California courts have generally upheld proposed state
uses of tidelands if the use has a colorable water-related purpose.67 Sax
concludes that California courts might be willing to impose limits on the
state's own power to impair public trust resources.68 He views these limited
restrictions on the state's capacity to act as both opening the door for liti-
gants to press for the process-based approach he associates with the• . 69
Massachusetts and Wisconsin decisions, as well as sending a warning
signal to the legislature not to assume complete judicial acquiescence in
such situations.
70
C. The Public Trust Doctrine Today
There is no question but that the public trust doctrine has blossomed
into an important doctrine in natural resource law. Since 1970, courts
from at least twenty-five American jurisdictions have embraced some form
of the doctrine.' Paralleling this widespread recognition has been a broad-
ening of the doctrine to include resources not previously within its
scope. The original Byzantine version of the doctrine concerned mainly71
water-based resources, although it also included air as a common prop-
erty. Since 1970, however, the doctrine has been invoked to support
claims for preservation of any number of natural areas and man-made
64. Since the publication of Sax's article, the California Supreme Court has embraced the
public trust doctrine much more explicitly. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
65. See Sax, supra note 3, at 528-29.
66. See id. at 534-38.
67. See, e.g., People v. City of Long Beach, 338 P.2d 177 (Cal. 1959) (upholding a lease of
state-owned land for the construction of an armed-ser'vices YMCA on the grounds that the facil-
ity would aid sailors).
68. See Sax, supra note 3, at 542-44.
69. See id. at 544.
70. See id. at 543-44.
71. See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 644 n.77 (listing numerous state cases involving the public
trust doctrine).
72. See supra note 30.
73. But see Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(holding that the public trust does not extend to air over the city).
75 . 76 7
items, including parks,74 historical areas, cemeteries, archeological sites
and remains," and works of art.7 9 While not all of these claims have been
accepted,80 courts are clearly receptive to requests to extend the doctrine
beyond its traditional water-related focus. This expansion is a logical
outgrowth of the willingness of late nineteenth-century courts to extend
the concept of public trust purposes to include, for the first time,
recreation. Given that opening, the recent expansion of the public trust
doctrine to protect a wide variety of natural, man-made, and cultural
resources follows relatively easily, leading to the important role the
doctrine plays today and suggesting the basis of an even more expanded
role for the doctrine, as called for by many commentators."'
This expansion in the doctrine's scope has troubled its critics,83 and
even its defenders, s4 in light of the potentially intrusive role the doctrine
allows for courts in natural resource decision making. Such expansion only
74. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); Wade v. Kramer,
459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 340
N.W.2d 722 (Wis. 1983).
76. See, e.g., Washington Metro. Transit Auth. v. Vestry of Rock Creek Parish, 514 F.2d
1350 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
77. See, e.g., San Diego County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr.
786 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the public trust doctrine cannot be extended to cover archeo-
logical remains located on private property).
78. See, e.g., Wade, 459 N.E.2d at 1025.
79. See Ellen R. Porges, Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 122
(1981) (suggesting a public trust basis for preserving the integrity of art work).
80. Some courts have refused to accept an unlimited expansion of the classes of resources
protectable under the doctrine. See, e.g., Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 788; Mamolella v. First
Bank, 423 N.E.2d 204; 206-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the public trust doctrine did
not extend to cover a junkyard alleyway).
81. See, e.g., Grand Rapids v. Powers, 50 N.W. 661 (Mich. 1891); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53
N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914);
see also Rose, supra note 28, at 754-58 (discussing the nineteenth-century cases concerning the
public trust character of hunting and fishing uses).
82. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995); Sax, supra note 32 (arguing that the
public trust doctrine should not be limited to a traditional set of water-based resources, but
instead should be viewed as protecting reasonable social expectations against destabilizing
change); Baer, supra note 6; Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Note, Extending Public Trust Duties to
Vermont's Agencies: A Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L.
REV. 509 (1995); Porges, supra note 79.
83. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 256-63 (criticizing the expansion of the public trust
doctrine beyond water-related resources).
84. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 907-14 (defending the doctrine but arguing
against its expansion to non-water-related resources).
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exacerbates what these commentators consider to be problems associated
with the public trust doctrine, such as its undemocratic nature, s8 the lati-
tude it gives for technically noncompetent courts to second-guess admin-
istrative decisions on highly complex matters,86 and the danger that courts
will overvalue public trust uses at the expense of private property rights.S7
As these problems grow, the common-law basis for the doctrine becomes
less compelling as it leaves behind its historical basis in water-related
88
resources.
1I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Introduction
As noted above, the growth of the public trust doctrine has not gone
uncriticized. Commentators have attacked courts' expanded use of the
doctrine to protect resources not originally within the doctrine's ambit, 9 as
well as its use as a check on governmental, as opposed to private, land-use
decisions. Commentators have also questioned the continued need for
the doctrine in a society in which environmental concerns clearly have the
attention of the public and the legislature.9' Especially in light of the pub-
lic's interest in environmental issues, and politicians' awareness of that
85. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 252 (arguing that in keeping with the English version
of the doctrine, which limited prerogatives only of the King, not of Parliament, the republican
form of American government should not logically be bound by the doctrine); Thompson, supra
note 38, at 912-13 (noting some risk in the "quasi-constitutional character of the public trust
doctrine," which limits legislative authority to override judicial miscalculations).
86. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 688 ("[Tlhe nature of today's environmental issues are
often so exceedingly complex that the judicial role must necessarily be limited and reliance on
administrative agencies must be great.").
87. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 911-12.
88. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 256-57 (arguing that an expansion in the doctrine's
scope "cuts the public trust doctrine off from its primary normative root").
89. See, e.g., id. at 256.
One rather significant change in the [public trust] doctrine over time has been its jour-
ney from the sea, up navigable streams, to unnavigable streams, its leap to inland ponds,
and then like our amphibian ancestors its eventual emergence from the water and
march across the land. This change in the doctrine is fundamental, radical, and
illegitimate.
Id.; see also Lazarus, supra note 2, at 710-12.
90. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 260-62.
91. See generally id. at 254-56 (arguing that increased public awareness of environmental
issues since 1970 obviates the need for the doctrine); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 643-47 (same).
interest, the doctrine has been criticized as a backward-looking,
antidemocratic vestige whose time, if it ever existed, has passed.92
These critiques boil down to the argument that today the public trust
doctrine is both unnecessary, in light of political developments, and
affirmatively undesirable, given its antidemocratic nature. This argument
finds a distinct, if distant, echo in the debate over the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution. As with the public trust doctrine,
judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause has been labeled anti-
democratic, even more so than judicial review under other constitutional
provisions that purportedly provide more explicit rules and correspondingly
less leeway for government by judicial policy preference.93 The parallel
between equal protection and the public trust doctrine becomes even closer
when one considers that scholars' efforts to answer the antidemocratic
charge have in both cases centered on attempts to cast judicial review in
terms of democracy-perfecting, instead of democracy-defeating. In the
public trust context, this attempt is best represented by Sax himself, whose
article repeatedly argues that the doctrine should be viewed as a means of
perfecting democracy by ensuring that public trust considerations be rep-
resented in the decision-making process. In the equal protection context,
the democracy-enhancing role of judicial review is best suggested by John
Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust.94 Ely explains and justifies judicial
review under the Equal Protection Clause by conceiving of such review as
protecting the democratic process. According to Ely, such judicial review
ensures the ability of all groups to participate in the democratic process by
guarding against the threats posed by both formal constraints on such par-
ticipation95 and de facto constraints in the form of majority prejudice that
hinders effective political participation.96
This Article examines whether and to what extent Ely's process-based
theory of the Equal Protection Clause provides insights useful to justi-
fication of the public trust doctrine. Specifically, this inquiry will attempt
to determine whether Ely's process theory resolves three issues prominent
in discussions of the public trust doctrine: first, can the doctrine be justified
against the charge that it constitutes antidemocratic judicial interference
in matters properly left to the political branches of government?; second,
92. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 251-53; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 691.
93. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 18, at 30-32 (concluding that the text and enactment history
of the Equal Protection Clause do not limit what is otherwise a sweeping mandate to judges to
evaluate the validity of legislative classifications).
94. Id.
95. See id. ch. 5.
96. See id. ch. 6.
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can coherent rules be developed regarding the scope of the resources pro-
tected by the doctrine?; and third, how should the doctrine be affected by
the unquestioned increase in governmental concern for the environment?
Before examining these links, however, it is necessary to outline the
debate over equal protection jurisprudence, and Ely's contribution to that
debate.
B. Ely and the Equal Protection Clause97
Ely bases his vision of the Equal Protection Clause on the well-known
footnote four of the Supreme Court's opinion in Carolene Products. He
identifies two broad situations in which footnote four suggests that defects
in the political process may justify stringent judicial review. The first is
marked by laws that impede activities, such as speech, assembly, and vot-
ing, that directly relate to political action. Judicial review of such laws
clearly reinforces democratic rule by ensuring that the political process is
truly open to all. In Ely's words, judicial review of such governmental
action "clear[s] the channels of political change."9 The second situation is
marked by governmental action that does not restrict politically relevant
activity, but instead imposes substantive burdens on discrete and insular
minorities. In Ely's view, such actions require close judicial scrutiny in
order to determine whether the legislature was motivated by prejudice
against the burdened group.9 Ely defines "prejudice," and explains when a
law should be considered a result of prejudice and not simply the burdened
group's political weakness, as an unwillingness to give "proper" con-
sideration to the arguments or the political power wielded by the burdened
minority due to some sort of irrational bias against that minority.' °
If the public trust doctrine is analogous to any part of Ely's equal pro-
tection theory, the analogy is to this latter, minority-burdening situation.
The public trust doctrine does not normally address situations analogous to
Ely's first situation-that is, situations in which government enacts laws
that have the effect of denying trust resources the chance to be "heard" in
97. This section provides only the most skeletal explanation of Ely's theory. For more
detailed discussions, see the sources cited at note 212 infra, critiquing Ely's theory. For an expla-
nation of his theory from a more sympathetic perspective, see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
98. ELY, supra note 18, at 105 (title to Chapter 5).
99. See id. ch. 6.
100. See id. at 152 (stating that a necessary element of the suspect class analysis is "that the
minority in question be one that is barred from the pluralist's bazaar, and thus keeps finding itself
on the wrong end of the legislature's classifications, for reasons that are in some sense
discreditable").
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the decision-making process. Rather, the idea behind the doctrine, at least
as explained by commentators such as Sax, is that government often makes
resource-allocation decisions that substantively burden public trust inter-
ests without giving appropriate consideration to those interests. Thus, this
Article will examine only this second aspect of Ely's theory.
Ely's justification for special judicial solicitude for discrete and insular
minorities traces ultimately to the value that there be no discrimination for
its own sake-that is, no discrimination solely for the sake of dis-
advantaging members of a particular group.'0 ' In discussing the means for
making this determination, Ely begins by noting the difficulty of uncover-
ing legislative motivations,'0 2 and he suggests that the now-familiar suspect
class-tight fit analysis serves as a proxy for determining legislative
motives.' °3 In other words, the requirement that certain laws be justified by
a close fit to a compelling governmental purpose reveals the true character
of acts that are motivated merely by a desire to harm certain groups,
because, according to Ely, it will be impossible to meet this strict scrutiny
by reference to a more legitimate motive.'
4
For present purposes, the important component of Ely's analysis con-
cerns the identification of the groups that should be the beneficiaries of
such strict scrutiny. This is a necessary part of his analysis; since all legis-
lation burdens members of particular groups, without a theory limiting the
reach of strict scrutiny courts could require that all legislation meet this
stringent standard. Ely starts his analysis of this issue with an institutional
competence point: the idea, he suggests, is to identify the groups that the
political branches of government have no interest in protecting, which will
then become the groups the courts are the best equipped to protect.' 5 This
establishes his embrace of Carolene's statement that laws burdening discrete
and insular minorities should be subject to special judicial scrutiny, since
prejudice against such groups makes it impossible for the disliked minority
to participate fully in, and thus protect its interests through, the political
process.'O Thus, Ely's reading of Carolene suggests that strict scrutiny be
applied only in cases in which the parties burdened by the statute have not
had the chance to participate in the political process producing the statute
because of some larger prejudice against that group.
101. See id. at 153.
102. See id. at 136-45.
103. See id. at 145-48.
104. See id. at 146.
105. See id. at 151.
106. See id. at 152-53.
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The.remaining task for Ely's theory, then, is to develop a means of
identifying such "suspect classes." Ely argues that courts should be espe-
cially concerned about legislative stereotypes that are self-serving, not just
in the material sense, but also in the psychic sense-that is, stereotypes
that tend to flatter the members of the groups that comprise the legis-
lature. 1°7 It is here that Ely begins to justify the familiar rule that suspect
class status turns on a group's discreteness and insularity, the history of dis-
crimination against it, and the immutability of its identifying char-
acteristic.'°  All of these factors, he suggests, speak to self-flattering and
other denigrating stereotypes, either by physically distinguishing between
the "we" and the "they" (immutability), or by reflecting social distance
between them (discreteness, insularity, and history of discrimination). In
this way, the criteria traditionally associated with "discrete and insular
minorities" make sense as justifications for strict scrutiny of legislation that
burdens such groups.109
Such is Ely's theory. This Article now examines the applicability of
Ely's theory to the public trust doctrine. The first step is to determine
whether public trust resources can even be theoretically analogized to sus-
pect classes as understood by Ely. If this analogy is at least theoretically
plausible, the next question becomes whether it makes sense as an empiri-
cal matter.
C. Are Public Trust Resources Analogous to Suspect Classes?
1. The Anthropomorphic Problem
The clearest difference between the public trust doctrine and process-
based equal protection jurisprudence is that the resources protected by the
public trust doctrine, being inanimate, do not participate in politics and
thus cannot meaningfully be said to be denied representation. This point is
not as obvious as it might at first seem. Nation-states "participate" in
world politics, lobbying assemblies comprised of other nations and making
commitments purporting to bind future governments of the signatory
nation. Corporations also participate in domestic politics," ° through
107. See id. at 158-59.
108. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (noting characteristics of suspect
classes); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26 (1973).
109. See ELY, supra note 18, at 160-70.
110. They may also participate in world politics, for example, by lobbying governments to
support an international treaty favorable to the corporation's interests.
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lobbying, speaking, and campaigning; indeed, they have been held to have
First Amendment rights-rights perhaps the most closely related to politi-
cal participation aside from actual voting."' Finally, and in a reasonably
close analogue to our situation, the Supreme Court's modern dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence relies to a great degree on whether the
challenged state law places especially heavy burdens on out-of-state eco-
nomic interests, including corporations, on the theory that such interests
deserve protection from such burdens due to their inability to participate in
the political process leading to the enactment of the challenged statute."'
Corporations' voices and ability to influence in other ways (most
notably by financial contributions and other material assistance) exist only
because the law allows and protects the combination of resources necessary
to form a corporation that can then organize itself and appoint human
agents to act on its behalf."' Nevertheless, the fact remains that the
American legal system does not generally recognize the legal existence of
nonhuman natural objects, whether or not animate, and regardless of
whether considered in the aggregate (for example, a species or plant genus,
an ecosystem, or a geological formation) or as an individual entity (for
instance, an animal, a plant, or a rock)."' Without the ability to organize
or speak on their own behalf, such resources cannot be viewed as par-
11. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding
that a utility company's First Amendment rights had been violated by the commission's require-
ment that the utility include with its bills non-bill-related information with which the utility
disagreed).
112. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)
("The existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the [challenged statute] is a pow-
erful safeguard against legislative abuse."); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for
those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those
out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been
thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress has not
acted.... Underlying the stated rule has been the thought... that when the regulation
is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legis-
lative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
Id. at 184 n.2 (citations omitted); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761, 767 (1945).
113. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 68, at 125-29 (3d ed. 1983); see also Christopher D. Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450,
452-53 (1972) (noting the relatively recent innovation of legal recognition of corporations).
114. But see Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law
and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985) (noting ambiguous
results from suits in which natural objects, joined by humans, attempted to sue).
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ticipating in the political process. Nor can it be said that interests, aside
from the articulate entities that espouse them, participate. Interests-
natural resource preservation, international trade promotion, or opposition
to Fidel Castro--do not participate in politics; rather, environmentalists,
exporters, and anti-Castro Floridians do. These facts raise questions about
the applicability of Ely's political-process theory to the public trust doc-
trine. For, if Ely's theory is really about ensuring that all groups can par-
ticipate in the give-and-take of the political process, it has no applicability
to a doctrine dealing not with recognized interest groups, but instead with
either inanimate resources or interests (as distinct from their human
espousers).
Nevertheless, Ely's access justification may still apply to public trust
resources. The difference in the public trust context is that access is pro-
vided not to the resources or interests themselves, but to their stand-in, or
virtual, representatives. This technique has been used in legal contexts
other than the Equal Protection Clause, most notably Article IV's privi-
leges and immunities clause"' and the dormant commerce clause." 6  In
both of these latter contexts, the Supreme Court seeks to ensure that states
not treat strangers discriminatorily, in part by examining whether an out-
of-state interest is "virtually represented" in that state's political process by
a similarly situated, and thus, similarly motivated, resident."7 Ely uses the
theory to support the idea that equality sometimes requires that the inter-
ests of the powerful be tied to those of the powerless, for example, by
requiring that legislation impose burdens on all similarly situated parties.,s
Analogously, a theory of virtual representation in the public trust context
115. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
116. While not textually independent of the interstate commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 2, the term "dormant commerce clause" has come to stand for the negative implications
of the interstate commerce clause, which have been interpreted to prohibit state regulation that
either directly discriminates against interstate commerce or places an overly heavy burden on
interstate commerce relative to local benefits. See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 403-41.
117. See, e.g., Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473 n.17 (upholding a statute against a dormant
commerce clause challenge in part because out-of-state economic interests challenging state law
had similarly situated analogues inside the state); see also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656, 662-63 (1975) (alluding to political representation theory in the context of the privileges
and immunities clause); cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (holding that Article
IV's privileges and immunities clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy"). For a critique of this
methodology, see West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 212 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (questioning the use of political-process methodology in the dormant commerce
clause context).
118. See ELY, supra note 18, at 82-87.
would inquire into whether the resource is adequately represented by an
articulate stand-in who would represent a pro-conservation interest.
Commentators have criticized the use of virtual representation in the
equal protection context. Most notably, Lea Brilmayer has argued that
Ely's process jurisprudence cannot adequately explain why only dis-
criminatory legislation enacted without the participation of the burdened
minority should be subject to special judicial scrutiny.Y9 She points out
that hostility or bias against an unrepresented minority may also take the
form of facially neutral legislation, legislation that, according to her read-
ing of Ely, would not be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny regardless of
the identification of any group as a suspect class.2 Brilmayer asks an
important question of process theory: Why should it be assumed that a
facially neutral statute reflects an absence of conflicts of interest between
the legislators and the nonparticipating group (and thus, virtual rep-
resentation of that group by that legislature)? Indeed, Brilmayer suggests
that even a statute that is not just facially, but truly, neutral (that is, has
neither a discriminatory motive nor a disparate impact) should be suspect
under Ely's analysis because of the process defect assumed by the suspect
class analysis.' In other words, if neutral statutes can still reflect process
defects, courts should review all legislation strictly so long as any suspect
class exists."'
These objections, however, do not pose as great a difficulty in the
public trust context, for reasons that go to the heart of the difference
between the public trust doctrine and traditional equal protection doctrine.
The difference lies in the remedy available for violations. To some degree,
process-based equal protection theory cannot hope to correct the flawed
process itself, but only to use process flaws as the justification for striking
down a statute. Under the public trust doctrine, however, there is the pos-
sibility of a true process-based remedy. Such a remedy is reflected, for
example, in the requirement, identified in the Massachusetts cases Sax
discusses, that an agency seeking to impair a public trust resource be
required to show explicit legislative authorization to do so.' Process-based
119. See Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1291, 1310-15 (1986).
120. See id. at 1306-15. Brilmayer acknowledges the possibility that current equal protec-
tion doctrine would allow an equal protection claim to be made against a facially neutral statute
whose enactment had a discriminatory motivation. See id. at 1311 n.63. However, she views
this exception as "de minimis." See id. at 1311.
121. See id. at 1307-15.
122. See id. at 1315.
123. See Sax, supra note 3, at 491-502.
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remedies appear even more clearly in the Wisconsin cases that require
public trust-impairing decisions to be made at a particular level of gov-
ernment.124 In a similar vein is the decision by the North Dakota Supreme
Court that the state's public trust doctrine requires comprehensive water-
use planning, not a particular outcome of that planning.' These remedies
amount to a judicial restructuring of the process by which government
makes decisions affecting public trust resources so as to ensure that such
resources will "be heard" in the decision-making process. Such restructur-
ing will, of course, affect future decisions as well as the particular decision
challenged in that case, and thus may have the effect of ensuring an appro-
priate process in all future decisions by that entity.
Because this remedy does not simply invalidate the substance of the
decision but instead corrects, for future effect, the process by which it was
made, it allows judicial involvement whenever there might be a process
defect, and not just (as Brilmayer argues is the case with Ely's theory) when
the substance of the governmental action adversely affects a suspect class.'
124. See id. at 509-23. It should be noted that the relationship between local interests and a
public trust resource is not as unambiguous as Sax or the Wisconsin cases suggest. For example,
in his discussion of Illinois Central, Epstein suggests that the relationship may in fact run in the
opposite direction-that is, that local interests may be the primary beneficiaries of the trust
resource's public status, while nonlocal interests might not benefit from the resource's public
status but would gain from the sale of the resource to a private interest. In such a situation, it
would be the local interests that would favor retention of public ownership. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATOJ. 411,424 n.5 (1987).
125. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 462-64 (N.D. 1976); see also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d
709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires the state to consider public
trust interests when planning and performing water resource allocation).
126. The uncertainty in this sentence arises from the difficulties a court would face in
determining the "appropriate" level of public resource representation in a given decision-making
process. See infra page 423423.
127. Another difference between the equal protection and public trust contexts is that
challenges under the latter could easily be limited to administrative action when judicial restruc-
turing of the process might be more easily and legitimately accomplished than restructuring of
the legislative process. Given separation of powers concerns, a court attempting to restructure
the legislative context might be limited to remanding the statute to the legislature, with the
requirement of either simple repassage, or repassage with an explicit acknowledgment of the
public trust impairment. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Anti-
discrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
HARV. L. REv. 80, 103-09 (1991) (outlining simple repassage requirement); Sax, supra note 3, at
496-502 (outlining repassage with an acknowledgment requirement).
An additional issue is the question of whether courts could hear cases alleging a defective
process when the outcome was not adverse to the plaintiff resource. This is not so much the
question of whether the resource itself would have standing, cf. Stone, supra note 113, but rather
whether any pro-resource plaintiff could sue when the government decision was favorable to the
resource. After a successful suit, however, the process would be subject to restructuring on a pro-
spective basis, thus obviating the problem in the future.
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This is virtual representation of a different sort, placing the trust resource
in the restructured political/administrative process in a position analogous
to that which Christopher Stone suggests for such resources in the adjudi-
cative process: just as Stone would give natural objects standing to defend
their own interests in courts, "virtually" represented by an articulate person125
or group, so too resources would be the participants in the governmental
decision-making process, again represented by an articulate person or
129group.
128. See Stone, supra note 113, at 464-73 (arguing that natural objects should be able to sue
through analogues to guardians ad litem).
129. Cf. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 269, 315-16 (1980) (arguing that the public trust doctrine focuses not on "some ill-
defined public interest," but on the public trust resources themselves).
As a more general matter, Brilmayer's analysis, supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text,
may not adequately consider the possibility, most forcefully presented by Judge Calabresi, of a
process remedy for equal protection violations analogous to that crafted in the public trust con-
text. This sort of remedy would entail a court remanding a constitutionally suspect statute to the
legislature, with the possibility that repassage would be constitutionally valid either because the
repassage would occur with inevitable attention paid to the court's constitutional suspicions
about the statute's first version, or because the repassage would occur in the present, when the
burdened group may enjoy more effective political participation than at the time the original
version was enacted. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 127, at 103-09 (suggesting that the invali-
dation of statutes is not the only option for judicial review of allegedly discriminatory laws and
suggesting that instead courts may be justified in remanding the statute to the legislature for
reconsideration and repassage that would then be immune from judicial review); see also Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring in the result) (concurring in
the decision to strike down New York's 168-year-old assisted-suicide law as violating the Equal
Protection Clause, but leaving open the possibility that the same statute repassed by the modem
New York legislature might be constitutional), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); ELY, supra note 18,
at 169-70 (holding that the modern repassage of a constitutionally suspect statute enacted dur-
ing a period when the burdened group was denied effective representation may justify upholding
the statute).
This analysis is also helped by the fact that, unlike citizens, public trust interests have no
inherent right to vote. The fact that citizens have this right to vote means, according to
Brilmayer, that virtual representation can never be a fully satisfactory justification for allowing
the assertion of governmental authority against an individual, because the point of the right to
vote is not to have a legislator who represents your interests despite your inability to vote, but
instead the right to exercise your own autonomy to vote for someone who will represent your
interest. It is for this reason that an examination of legislative outcomes may not be the most
appropriate way to determine whether there has been a process defect in the equal protection
context: Even if someone did represent your interests in the legislature, if you did not have a
hand in choosing that representative you are still, in a real way, not "represented." This concern
also reflects, in part, the idea that citizens' interests and preferences should not be assumed given
our belief in a citizen's right to decide what her own interests are. The situation in the public
trust context is not as complicated. The concern in that context is simply to restructure the
government decision-making process so that the trust interest can be expected to have such
representation. Because there is no corresponding right of trust interests to select represen-
tatives, virtual representation is all that is required.
There may also be a more straightforward answer to Brilmayer's argument. Many govern-
ment decisions coming under public trust scrutiny are made by agencies whose primary mission at
Thus, the idea of virtual representation makes it possible to think of
public trust resources as possible beneficiaries of a process-based juris-
prudence. But to what end?
2. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Political Process
While the anthropomorphic problem discussed above does not auto-
matically make it impossible to justify special judicial solicitude for public
trust resources by reference to a quasi-political-process theory of judicial
review, there nevertheless remains the question of whether that theory
does in fact fit the situation posed by government resource-allocation deci-
sions. In other words, now that public trust resources can theoretically be
characterized in a manner analogous to discrete and insular minorities, the
next question is, do they in fact satisfy the criteria for being so char-
acterized? After a brief recapitulation of Ely's suspect class theory, this
Article considers the applicability of that theory to public trust resources.
Briefly stated, Ely's theory posits that legislation should be suspect,
and thus subject to searching judicial scrutiny, when it burdens groups that
are unable fully to participate in the political process due to some prejudice
against them. Prejudice plays a crucial role in Ely's analysis because,
according to Ely, it blinds legislators to the existence of common interests
between them (or their constituencies) and the victim of the prejudice.
For Ely, it is prejudice that differentiates "perfectly respectable"3 refusals
best ignores, or, more usually, is implicitly hostile to, public trust values. Commentators have
noted the tendency of agencies to suffer from a sort of tunnel vision, obscuring values that are
tangential to their primary mission. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Admin-
istrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 763 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Lessons]. Indeed,
judicial recognition of this tendency has been a major factor behind the increased rigor of judi-
cial review of agency action starting in the 1970s. See, e.g., id.; see also Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1698-1702 (1975)
[hereinafter Stewart, Reformation]. The Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), suggests that this more
rigorous review appears to have survived the Court's restriction on other forms of judicial scru-
tiny of agency action. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (enunciating the presump-
tion of unreviewability of agency decisions not to prosecute); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (restricting judicial imposi-
tion, in the context of informal agency rule making, of procedural requirements beyond those
required by the APA). This insight suggests that the virtual-representation problem posed by
Brilmayer is less compelling in this context, where it can be reasonably presumed that action
taken by certain types of government agencies may not take public trust values fully into
account. In other words, the existence or absence of virtual representation may be easier to per-
ceive in this context, based on insights about administrative agency behavior, than in the normal
legislative context.
130. ELY, supra note 18, at 152.
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to deal with other groups from reasons that are constitutionally
"discreditable.''. Such prejudice-based refusals to deal in turn result in a
malfunction of the pluralist political process-that is, the process by which
the desires of numerous interest and/or affinity groups are mediated
through a bargaining process that produces legislation.'32 At this point,
Ely's analysis is vulnerable to the charge of encouraging judicial self-
aggrandizement to the extent it allows courts to determine when such
blinding prejudice exists and when it corrupts the political process. Rec-
ognizing this problem, Ely suggests that courts employ strict scrutiny only
when the legislature's classification "involv[es] a generalization whose inci-
dence of counter-example is significantly higher than the legislative
authority appears to have thought it was."' 33 According to Ely, such legis-
lative "mistakes" can be expected to appear most often when the legis-
lature's generalizations embody stereotypes that reflect favorably on groups
that dominate the legislature and unfavorably on less powerful groups.
Ely then discusses the method for determining which groups might fall
victim to the stereotyping process outlined above. His discussion makes
heavy use of the concept of discrete and insular minorities, introduced in
Carolene's footnote four. As noted above, Ely suggests that strict scrutiny
should be reserved for legislation reflecting stereotypes that burden those
unlike the legislators, on the theory that most humans-including legis-
lators-are, as a psychological matter, more prone to adopt inaccurate
stereotypes when they flatter the particular individual or her group or, con-
versely, when they denigrate other groups. 34 In Ely's argument, however,
the concept of "other groups" encompasses the idea of social distance, so
that a group's discreteness and insularity become key criteria for whether a
group is prey to such inaccurate legislative denigration and, thus, a suspect
class. As he puts it, "[o]ne can empathize without having been there,' 3
suggesting that social interaction with a group's members allows the cor-
rection of mistaken stereotypes. By contrast, a group's discreteness and
insularity make social distance both possible (because the group's discrete-
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 17-21
(1991) (describing the pluralist content of American politics). Of course, this is not the only
description of a well-functioning political process. For example, in recent years, scholars have
shown new interest in "republican" theories of government characterized not by the sort of bar-
gaining noted above, but instead by the search for the "general good," or "republican virtue."
See, e.g., id. at 42-47 (describing the basic tenets of republicanism).
133. ELY, supra note 18, at 157.
134. See id. at 158-60.
135. Id. at 160.
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ness makes the group socially identifiable) and likely (because the group's
insularity makes its social segregation easier).
136
With the theory thus sketched, the question is framed: to what extent
do the insights of Ely's process-based equal protection"' theory apply to
governmental decision making affecting public trust resources?
a. Public Trust Resources as Discrete and Insular Minorities
First, can public trust resources be conceptualized as discrete and insu-
lar minorities? Certainly, the anthropomorphic problem arises again, this
time at the more focused level of suspect class analysis. Specifically, Ely's
focus on stereotyping and social interaction as important indicia of
discreteness and insularity seems, at best, only remotely applicable to non-
human resources. Legislators may or may not utilize, appreciate, or even
know of the existence of particular public trust resources, but even if it
made sense to speak of such unawareness as the lack of social interaction, it
certainly makes no sense to speak of the results of such unawareness as
"inaccurate stereotyping." This conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme
Court's illustration of various indicia of suspect class status: a history of
purposeful unequal treatment or subjection to disabilities based on inaccu-
rate stereotyping;"" social stigmatization;3 9 and possession of an immutable
defining characteristic"O that bears no rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose. These indicia again reflect an underlying focus on social
136. Curiously, Ely does not use his idea of social distance to explain the very deferential
quality of judicial review of social and economic legislation. That is, 'instead of arguing that
competing social and economic forces are normally present in society and able to correct any
inaccurate stereotypes held by the legislature, Ely argues that the lack of "self-serving generaliza-
tions" in these statutes suffices to render the classification "constitutionally unsuspicious." ELY,
supra note 18, at 159-60 & nn.*. This alternative explanation, based on the same realities of
social intercourse Ely identifies, seems at least as valid as his own rationale for suggesting only
deferential review of such classifications.
137. The best-known application of this theory is, of course, in equal protection analysis;
however, it has also found its way into other areas of constitutional law, such as the dormant
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656, 662-63 (1975) (alluding to this theory in the context of the privileges and
immunities clause); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184
n.2 (1938) (alluding to this theory in the context of the dormant commerce clause).
138. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
139. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
140. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (noting the unfairness of punish-
ing an illegitimate child based on illegitimacy given the fact that the child was not responsible
for that condition) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)).
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (describing as indicia of
suspectness whether a class possesses an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the acci-
dent of birth [or] is ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
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oppression that seems far removed from the concern that public trust val-
ues are systematically ignored in the political and administrative process. If
an analogy is to be drawn between this latter concern and Ely's theory, it
must lie in an alternative conceptualization of the criteria for suspect class
status.
One possible alternative conception centers on Ely's idea of empathy.
Ely suggests that a legislator's empathy for a group may suffice to prevent
stereotyping of the sort Ely condemns, even though the legislature may not
be composed of such groups. '  Empathy in this sense refers to an appre-
ciation for the position a potentially burdened group finds itself in, based
not on the legislator's current life position, but on his emotional closeness
either, first, to that position or, second, to others who disclose that they are
in that position. Ely uses the concept of age to illustrate the first of these
situations. As Ely notes, most legislators are not young, but they were
young once, and many legislators are not old, but they all hope and to some
degree expect to become old.'43 Thus, Ely suggests that legislation classify-. '44
ing on the basis of age should not be subject to strict scrutiny. But as to
the second situation, as Ely says, "[olne can empathize without having been
there;"'45 thus, he also argues that a legislator's social contact with members
of a group can break down barriers of ignorance, thus dissuading the legis-
lator from supporting legislation based on inaccurate stereotyping. To
illustrate this idea, Ely uses two examples: hypertension sufferers and
homosexuals. Ely suggests that a hypertensive could be expected to dis-
close her condition to a legislator considering a bill reflecting inaccurate
and denigrating stereotypes of hypertension sufferers (for example, a bill
prohibiting them from driving). This social contact reduces the chance
that such laws will be enacted even though the legislature itself may
include no hypertensives. The limits of this idea of social contact are illus-
trated by Ely's example of homosexuals. While a legislator might have
social contact with both hypertensives and homosexuals, Ely suggests that
the former would be far more likely to disclose to the legislator their char-
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process") (quoting San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Clas-
sifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 938 (1991).
142. See ELY, supra note 18, at 160.
143. See id. But see Calabresi, supra note 127, at 149 (suggesting that laws burdening the
young may be constitutionally suspect under a constitutional analysis focusing on an anti-
discrimination value).
144 See ELY, supra note 18, at 160.
145. Id.
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acteristic than the latter, given the underlying societal prejudice that
would likely impose a cost on a homosexual should he disclose. Thus,
while the legislator may have social contact with both groups, the social
prejudice against the homosexual makes it more likely that the legislator
will not be made aware of that contact, and that, unlike in the case of
hypertensives, preexisting antihomosexual stereotypes will not be cor-
rected. For these reasons, Ely suggests that hypertensives should not be a
suspect class and that homosexuals should be. 46 More importantly for the
present analysis, in this way Ely brings the discussion back to current equal
protection doctrine, identifying discreteness, insularity, and existing
prejudice as factors in determining whether a group is a suspect class.
Can the concept of empathy link process theory to natural resource
decision making? At first glance the analogy is not particularly close.
Most obviously, we again have a slightly different version of the anthropo-
morphism problem discussed earlier. 147  Again, the problem is that the
concept of empathy, at least as Ely uses it, refers to social relations, such as
the feelings legislators might have for groups of persons, such as racial or
religious minorities. It makes sense to speak of empathy, or lack thereof,
based on whether the legislator has first-hand experience with individuals
he knows have a particular attribute. It is quite a different thing to speak
of a legislator's or an administrator's empathy for a tree. One may certainly
feel affection for trees or other natural objects and may feel very strongly
about the need to protect them, but this is simply not the same as feeling as
though you were "of" the tree, in the way suggested by Ely's use of the term
"'empathy."'14
On another level, however, there is something to the idea of empathy
for trees. It may be logical to think of "bureaucratic empathy" in the sense
of whether the governmental decision-making process is structured to
ensure consideration of public trust values. Under this view of empathy,
146. See id. at 162-64.
147. See supra Part II.C.1.
148. Dictionary definitions of the word "empathy" actually suggest that the term applies
both to feelings for humans and for nonhuman objects. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 603 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "empathy" as
"[ildentification with and understanding of another's situation, feelings, and motives" and"[tihe
attribution of one's own feelings to an object"); RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 433
(rev. ed. 1975) (defining "empathy" as "intellectual identification with or vicarious experiencing
of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another person" and "the imaginative ascribing to an
object, as a natural object or work of art, feelings or attitudes present in oneself"). Even conced-
ing that the theoretical idea of empathy could transfer to feelings for natural objects, the diffi-
culty and intrusiveness of a judicial inquiry into whether decisionmakers had sufficient empathy
for natural resources strongly counsels against a literal transfer of Ely's concept into natural
resources law.
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the issue is not whether decisionmakers feel sufficiently "close" to resources
so as to ensure that they not impose burdens on such resources due to inap-
propriate stereotyping or even hostility. Instead, the question would be
whether the decision-making process is structured to allow for careful con-
sideration of public trust resources when decisions might impair them.
This type of empathy, then, is not created by the preexisting ties that bind
legislators to particular groups and that, conversely, estrange them from
others. Instead, the empathy is of a virtual sort, created by structuring
decision-making processes so that forces expected to favor resource con-
servation do in fact have a voice in such decisions. 49 To the extent that
governmental structures do not feature such built-in public trust advocates,
it could be suggested that public trust resources suffer from a lack of empa-
thy at the decision-making level, in roughly the same way that discrete and
insular groups of individuals may suffer such lack of empathy in the
legislature.
Ely's idea of empathy and the idea of empathy offered here play analo-
gous roles in their respective inquiries. For Ely, the idea of empathy traces
back-through the ideas of discrete and insular minorities, suspect classes,
and strict scrutiny-to provide a more feasible method of ferreting out the
intentional discrimination that Ely sees as the heart of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause's prohibition.15 Analogously, the lack of a voice in favor of
the preservation of public trust resources-that is, the lack of "bureaucratic
empathy"-could be viewed as a surrogate for a determination of whether
the government is in fact fulfilling its duty to manage the trust resources
consistent with their protected character. Rather than examining the sub-
stance of the trust-impairing decision to determine whether that decision
did in fact satisfy some substantive level of resource protection (the analog,
149. This analysis leaves open the major empirical question of whether such forces can, in
fact, be relied upon to lobby effectively in favor of resource conservation. For example, at the
federal level, to what extent can the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actually be
expected to be a solid voice in favor of resource conservation and, conversely, to what extent has
the agency been captured by the interests it was intended to regulate? In the actual case of the
EPA, a strong argument can be made that, as an empirical matter, the agency has not been cap-
tured and does in fact represent a strong voice for the environment. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank,
Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency
Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1277-78 (1996)
(concluding that the EPA is less liable to capture than other agencies because of the diversity of
industries it regulates). Presumably, this same rationale would apply to state environmental pro-
tection agencies. Conversely, this rationale is less applicable to the extent that the entity
entrusted with the trust-protection function was more focused on one particular subject-matter
area.
150. See ELY, supra note 18, at 153 (describing the "functional significance of a theory of
suspect classifications" as that of "flushing out unconstitutional motivations").
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in terms of judicial intrusiveness and difficulty of proof, of an equal pro-
tection inquiry into the ultimate question of whether the legislature
intended to discriminate'), the court would instead inquire into whether
the decision-making process was characterized by empathy-in this case,
the "bureaucratic empathy" of a built-in voice for trust preservation. In
both doctrines, the test employed by the courts is viewed as a surrogate for
determining compliance with the ultimate value. This indirection is nec-
essary given the difficulty of judicial determination of the ultimate issue, be
it intentional discrimination or an appropriate level of public trust
protection.
This idea of empathy is at least theoretically plausible. But what does
it mean?
b. The Implications of an Empathy-Based Theory of
Public Trust Protection
The analysis thus far brings the discussion to a familiar place, namely,
the interest-group theory of administrative law. That theory, set forth
comprehensively in Richard Stewart's 1975 analysis of American admin-
istrative law, 151 notes the breakdown of earlier models of administrative
action that centered either on a formalistic conception of administrative
agencies as mere transmission belts for legislative policy directives,153 or,
alternatively, as apolitical bodies applying specialized expertise to
essentially technical problems. 54 In place of these discredited' 55 theories,
Stewart describes and analyzes a new paradigm for administrative law, one
based on the theory that administrative agencies legislate, and do so in an
atmosphere marked by sharp clashes between a variety of interests that
have a stake in the agency's decision. He proposes a model of admin-
istrative law primarily concerned with ensuring representation for all inter-
ests affected by an agency's action. The model envisions this access
concern as influencing not just requirements for the agencies' procedure,
but also the availability of judicial review of agency action through then-
151. See id. at 136-45; cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628-53 (1982) (suggesting the
difficulty of the discriminatory intent issue); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976)
(holding that an Equal Protection Clause violation requires discriminatory intent).
152. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 129.
153. See id. at 1671-88 (describing the "traditional" model and noting reasons for its
decline).
154. See id. at 1702-11 (describing the expertise model and noting reasons for its decline).
155. See sup'ra notes 153 and 154.
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recent innovations such as relaxed standing requirements and increased
reviewability of agency action.15
6
It is through this concern with access to the decision-making process
that Stewart's analysis of administrative law intersects with the political-
process view of the public trust doctrine developed in this Article. Both of
these ideas propose the possibility of restructuring governmental decision-
making processes so that otherwise unrepresented or underrepresented
interests may participate in and influence the ultimate decision. Stewart
himself notes a number of methods of restructuring the process, from
157
agency-initiated decisions to provide "public interest" representation, to
various theories of judicial review of agency action. Among the options
considered by Stewart are those that: require that the agency give
"adequate consideration" to the information provided by interested par-
ties; 15 interpret agency-authorizing statutes so as to construe agency dis-
cretion narrowly; 159 involve the court directly in weighing the conflicting
interests affected by the agency's decision making;16° protect interests the
court considers to be underrepresented in the agency's decision-making
process;' 6' and remand questionable agency actions for approval by the leg-
islature. 62 The sort of suspect class analysis developed by this Article finds
distinct echoes in at least the first and fourth of these possible remedies,
suggesting again the familiar nature of the spot at which this Article's
analysis has arrived.
Stewart is ultimately pessimistic about the workability of these
methods. Most importantly for present purposes, Stewart considers a
suspect class type of administrative law theory to be too indeterminate.
Specifically, he doubts whether courts could develop coherent and
principled criteria for determining when in fact an interest is
underrepresented and thus eligible for heightened judicial solicitude. 61
Thus, in terms of this Article's equal protection analogy, Stewart expresses
concern about courts' ability to determine whether a group is a "suspect
156. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 129, at 1711-16.
157. See id. at 1763.
158. See id. at 1781-84.
159. See id. at 1785-86.
160. See id. at 1786-87.
161. See id. at 1787-88.
162. See id. at 1788-89.
163. See id. at 1787.
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class."'64 He also expresses concern that such a "suspect class"
determination requires a judicial assessment of the importance of the
interest alleged to be underrepresented. 6 1 If so, the court essentially
decides the ultimate substantive correctness of the agency's action while
purporting to determine only whether an interest is eligible for judicial
scrutiny. 166  These concerns lead Stewart to doubt the workability and
coherence of importing suspect class analysis into the administrative
process.
Stewart's objections must be met if the equal protection analogy is to
hold. Most importantly, this sort of process review must provide a prin-
cipled and coherent methodology for determining when a government
decision should receive special judicial scrutiny while simultaneously
avoiding judicial prejudgment of any particular agency action.' 67 Blanket
strict scrutiny of every agency decision potentially affecting a public trust
resource is far too broad a role for the courts, since most any governmental
action can be conceived of as affecting the environment. 16  This is espe-
cially true when one considers the difficult policy and value issues that
would have to be determined by a court faced with a public trust-based
164. Stewart also wonders whether "[elven the very concept of interests ascertainable apart
from the institutions which define them and realize their purposes" is coherent. See id. at
1787-88.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1787. Indeed, the contrast between the modest aspirations of the proposed
judicial review and its actual intrusiveness becomes even starker when one considers that the
process remedy suggested by this Article (that is, the judicial restructuring of the agency's process
as opposed to the review of the substance of the agency's decision) promises not even to concern
itself with, let alone overturn, the actual substantive decisions made by agencies.
167. Of course, this may be an unfairly stringent criterion. Even the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the level of scrutiny accorded legislation challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause effectively determines whether it is struck down or upheld. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 219 n.6 (1984) ("As one commentator observed, strict-scrutiny review is 'strict' in
theory but usually 'fatal' in fact.") (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 237 (1995) ("(W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact."').
168. The lower Pennsylvania courts have noted this fact as support for a rather meager
interpretation of that state's constitutional provision establishing Pennsylvania's trusteeship over
the state's public natural resources. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886, 895 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), off d, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973); see also
Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). For
more in-depth discussions of these decisions, see infra Part IV.A.3.
challenge to an agency action.6 9 Can there be a principled stopping point
to such strict scrutiny?
Sax offers an analysis that may yield such a point. In his article, Sax
suggests a two-stage test for public trust doctrine-based challenges to gov-
ernmental action. The first step is the identification of situations in which
a political imbalance exists at a systemic level. For Sax, the existence of
that situation justifies judicial refusal to indulge in the usual presumption
of administrative regularity7 (which appears to be nothing but a rewording
of the idea of strict scrutiny 71). After application of the first step estab-
lishes that a particular decision requires closer judicial scrutiny than usual,
the second step envisions courts testing the challenged action against four
criteria that, according to Sax, shed light on whether or not the action was
"properly handled.' '7  For present purposes, the important part of Sax's
proposed method is the first step, which attempts to discern whether there
exist in the political or administrative decision-making entity systemic
biases against appropriate consideration of public trust interests.
By itself, Sax's analysis provides an insufficient method for deter-
mining which interests have been underrepresented and, of those, which
are worthy of judicially mandated representation and in which contexts.
Sax argues that an interest's diffuse character-for example, being held by
all members of the public-signals the existence of underrepresentation
justifying judicial intervention, '" an argument that finds echoes in the lit-
erature of interest-group theory.171 As commentators on that theory have
noted, however, it is impossible to characterize an outcome as the result of
inappropriately disproportionate influence on the decision-making process
169. Cf. Stewart, Reformation, supra note 129, at 1785 (casting doubt on the judicial practice
of narrowly construing agency-authorization statutes to ensure consideration of underrepresented
interests, based on a concern that such practice "tends to multiply the issues for decision in a way
that diminishes the odds of finding a clear statutory directive to resolve the controversy").
170. See Sax, supra note 3, at 561.
171. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (phrasing the
analysis later interpreted as strict scrutiny as a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality").
172. See Sax, supra note 3, at 562. Those four criteria are the following: (1) "has public
property been disposed of at less than market value under circumstances which indicate that
there is no very obvious reason for the grant of a subsidy;" (2) "has the government granted to
some private interest the authority to make resource-use decisions which may subordinate broad
public resource uses to that private interest;" (3) "has there been an attempt to reallocate diffuse
public uses either to private uses or to public uses which have less breadth;" and (4) "whether the
resource is being used for its natural purpose-whether, for example, a lake is being used 'as a
lake."' Id. at 562-65.
173. Seeid. at 561.
174. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 127 (2d ed. 1971); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 132, at 72.
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merely because a more narrowly held interest was vindicated at the expense
of a broader but more diffuse one. 75 Their insight-that a well-functioning
political process may in fact vindicate such narrow interests, if those inter-
ests are intensely held-makes it impossible merely to "count heads" and
conclude that aggressive judicial review is appropriate simply because a
decision impairs a broadly held public interest-for example, a decision to
alienate a public trust resource.
This problem, serious enough at the theoretical level, applies with
special force in the public trust context, where considerations of resource
conservation and alienation collide at a variety of different angles. Several
hypothetical situations illustrate this point. In the first, the issue before an
agency is whether to open a wilderness area for oil exploration. In the sec-
ond, the issue is whether to make that same area accessible to tourists by
the construction of roads, hotels, and campgrounds, and the normal associ-
ated service establishments. In the third situation, the issue is whether to
bring a complaint in the appropriate international forum against a foreign
nation for alleged noncompliance with the environmental provisions of a
particular free-trade treaty. Environmental issues arise in each of these
situations but in different contexts and with different countervailing inter-
ests. The first of these situations is the classic "economic exploitation ver-
sus wilderness preservation" conflict, which clearly seems to require some
sort of consideration of pure trust conservation values. Any administrative
decision that failed to consider such values would be illegitimate under a
theory like Sax's. The second presents a case in which environmental
interests arguably exist on both sides: preservation of areas as wilderness
and public access to such areas."' The third hypothetical presents a situa-
tion in which trust preservation interests conflict with qualitatively dif-
ferent interests dealing with foreign affairs. How is a court to evaluate in
each of these cases whether a systematic bias existed that had the effect of
denying the "appropriate" amount of administrative consideration to trust-
protection interests? These examples make it hard to disagree with the
conclusion that determination of the appropriate amount of administrative
consideration depends, more than anything else, on one's sense of the
appropriate substantive balance to be drawn between the competing
considerations.
1 77
175. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-59 (1991).
176. Cf., e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 889 (discussing the types of rights the public
should have in land held as commons).
177. See Elhauge, supra note 175, at 49-50. The fact that the public trust doctrine discussed
in this Article does not envision judicial dictation of the substance of government decision, but
423
Beyond the possibility that the inquiry into systemic decision-making
bias may lack generally applicable decisional criteria, the scope of such
inquiry may be nearly infinite. Sax notes that his theory of judicial review
would justify strict scrutiny of administrative action in other areas, for
example, consumer protection and regulations affecting the poor.' While
not strictly the concern of this Article, the objection must still be answered
that a suspect class type of analysis, if applied to public trust issues, would
logically justify strict judicial scrutiny of a variety of subject areas, creating
a uniquely powerful, and possibly ungovernable, judicial tool. Again,
commentators on interest-group theory have also made this observation.'
79
The possibility that this theory's logical implications require a radical
reworking of the judicial role in administrative law,'80 while not necessarily
fatal to the theory, nevertheless strains the theory past the breaking point.
In searching for principles that limit the scope of this theory, one final
issue requires attention. Suspect class analysis assumes that the party bene-
fiting from strict judicial scrutiny is particularly unsuccessful in the
political arena. How can we analogize public trust resources to discrete and
insular minorities when the environment is a political winner?
c. The Problem of Political Success
Assuming the validity of the analogy to Ely's process theory, political
success should at least call into question any suggestion that public trust
resources deserve heightened judicial protection. The relationship
between process theory and political success is complex. Ely notes, for
example, the electoral successes of the African-American community, the
quintessential suspect class.' On a more theoretical level, Bruce
Ackerman questions the coherence of political-process theory based in part
on the difficulty of determining "how much" political success should be
only scrutiny of the process by which it was made, does not solve the problem. Even with such a
process-based remedy there is the problem that the reviewing court will perceive an illegitimate
imbalance in the decision-making process and thus require a "fairer" process simply because the
court has a sense that substantively the decision should reflect a more pro-trust value.
178. See Sax, supra note 3, at 557.
179. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 132, at 63-87.
180. While this Article confines itself to administrative law, interest-group theorists have
used arguments akin to Sax's to justify a vastly increased judicial role in other areas as well, from
statutory interpretation to constitutional law. See id. at 67 nn.12 & 13 (citing scholars calling
for increased judicial constitutional scrutiny of economic legislation); Elhauge, supra note 175, at
45-46 (citing scholars calling for use of courts' statutory interpretation power to limit the power
of interest groups).
181. See ELY, supra note 18, at 151-52.
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"enough" to reflect a lack of suspect class status, given the fact that a well-
functioning pluralist political bazaar should result in small groups suffering
frequent losses.t" 2
Ely himself, after raising the example of African-American political
success, never provides a satisfactory response to the political success
"problem."'85  But any application of a process-based theory of judicial
review to natural resource conservation requires such an answer, given the
unquestioned potency of environmental conservation as a political value in
contemporary America. It has been suggested that this political success
may be due to the rise of environmental advocacy groups in American
politics.'84 These organizations, by educating, mobilizing, and providing a
focal point for otherwise-dormant public opinion, may in fact directly cure
one of the major process defects Sax identifies-namely, the diffuse nature
of resource-conservation interests. 85  Regardless of the reasons for the
environment's political success, the question remains the same: What are
the grounds for protecting natural resources on the theory that they are
voiceless in the political process when the last fifteen years "have witnessed
a fantastic effort to develop a framework of legal rules reflecting this
nation's increased awareness of the adverse impacts of environmental pol-
lution and degradation?"'
182. See Ackerman, supra note 18, at 719-22.
183. After noting the issue, Ely does not do much more than suggest that a theory that did
not result in suspect class status for African Americans "is at least in need of some reexamina-
tion." ELY, supra note 18, at 152. However, he does append to that statement a cross-reference
to his discussion of empathy and his thesis that social interaction with an outsider group should
mitigate that group's discreteness and insularity. See id. at 152 n.62 (cross-referencing a later
discussion at pages 160-161 of the book). The cross-referenced discussion to empathy suggests,
in fact, that political success could even potentially work against the minority by exacerbating
preexisting prejudices against that group. See id. at 161. Ely thus seems to suggest that political
success, by itself, will not disqualify a group from suspect status.
The problem with Ely's analysis is that it decouples his justification for judicial review from
what is arguably his only value-neutral criterion, that is, the burdened group's political access, as
measured by political success. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that Ely immediately follows his
discussion of African-American political success by introducing the idea of "prejudice," as used
in footnote four of Carolene Products. See ELY, supra note 18, at 152-53. It is only by introducing
such a value-laden concept that Ely is able to justify judicial review. Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursu-
ing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 735 (1991)
(describing Ely's discussion of prejudice as a "slide into substance").
184. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 892.
185. See id. But see id. at 899 (arguing that "public saliency of most resource issues is not as
high as is public appreciation for pollution and health issues"). It may bear repeating at this
point that such public opinion may function as the surrogate voice for the resources themselves,
as discussed earlier. See supra Part I1.C.1.
186. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 631; see also Stewart, Lessons, supra note 129, at 714-15
(suggesting that "discrete and insular minority" analysis is inapplicable to environmental claims
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It is possible to quarrel with the premise that public trust interests
have found effective protection in the political arena. Most importantly,
states have been slow to follow the federal government's lead in enacting
provisions paralleling the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),, S7
the statute most consistent with the view of the public trust doctrine as a
requirement that public trust values be considered in every governmental
decision.'8 It is also possible, although not obvious, that states lag in the
techniques, discussed more generally below, 9 for ensuring the transmission
of political values to the agency decision-making process.19  Nevertheless,
no one can deny that the environment is a topic that commands political
attention at both the state and national level. How can courts be justified
in giving it special protection?
One answer to this question is to deny the relevance of the environ-
ment's political success on the grounds that natural resource decision
making is most often made by administrative agencies and not directly by
popularly elected legislatures. This argument even has its own process ring
to it, as it suggests that agencies are not implementing the pro-
environment mandates that the well-functioning legislature is producing.
because of clear evidence of legislative concern for such interests). Lazarus wrote in the mid-
1980s and referred to the 15 years between 1970 and 1985; however, his comment could just as
well be updated to take into account the last decade and, indeed, the last few years. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Berke, In a Reversal, GOP Courts the "Greens," N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at Al
(noting the political losses suffered by the Republican Party based on its perceived anti-
environmental stance); John H. Cushman, Jr., Environment Gets a Push from Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 1995, at All (noting the continued political popularity of environmental protection
despite an otherwise antigovernment political trend after the 1994 elections).
187. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
188. Twenty-five years after NEPA's enactment, only 16 states, plus the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico, have enacted "little NEPA" analogues. See David Sive, National Environmental
Policy Act, "Little NEPAs," and the Environmental Impact Assessment Process, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION 1191, 1193 (ALI-ABA Course of Study June 26, 1995), available in WESTLAW,
C127 ALI-ABA.
189. See infra notes 192-203.
190. Most notably, oversight of agencies by legislatures or executives may remain somewhat
less developed at the state level, although this is far from clear. On state legislatures' oversight,
see L. Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and
Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982). By 1985, at least 37 states provided for some
type of legislative review of administrative rule making. See Barbara L. Borden, Comment, Legis-
lative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: A Constitutional Analysis, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 526
n.275. Governors also enjoy some control over agency rule making. See, e.g., infra note 196
(noting governors' use of executive orders aimed at administrative agencies). For a review of one
state's experience with executive oversight, see Jonathan Rose, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking
in Arizona: The Governor's Regulatory Review Council-The First Three Years, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
425. Finally, at least some state laws provide for citizen enforcement. See Frona M. Powell, The
Public Trust Doctrine: Implications for Property Owners and the Environment, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 255,
264 (1997) (noting that "a number" of state environmental laws include citizen suit provisions).
This last point aside, though, the main idea here is that the administrative
(as opposed to legislative) context of the relevant decision making renders
the electoral potency of environmental conservation irrelevant for
purposes of determining underrepresentation. This response makes sense at
least as a theoretical possibility. Certainly, battles won in the legislature
have often been lost again in the bureaucracy, specifically in the area of
environmental protection. 9'
This is not a complete answer, however. First, the political popularity
of environmental conservation should, other things being equal, motivate
politicians to keep a careful watch on any backsliding by administrative
agencies. As an empirical matter, it is not clear that such watchdog actions
are normally as politically visible (and thus attractive to politicians) as the
enactment of new laws; 192 nor is it clear that legislatures are institutionally
capable of conducting meaningful oversight, even assuming that legislators
have a political motivation to do so.' Nevertheless, the potential for
legislative oversight and correction of agency action or inaction suggests
that there may be less of a role for activist judicial review in this area based
on a political-process concern. Second, at least at the federal level, the
executive can influence agency action, especially through the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).'94 While executive oversight
has its own limitations, 95 it nevertheless provides another mechanism by
which a politically responsive institution can influence the conduct of an
191. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 327-28 (2d Cir.
1976) (interpreting the Clean Air Act as requiring the EPA to include in its list of hazardous air
pollutants any pollutant that the agency had already determined to be a health risk, based in part
on concern that a contrary interpretation would frustrate congressional intent); cf. Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.")
(interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969).
192. For general discussions of the problems of legislative oversight, see CHRISTOPHER H.
FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF
SOCIAL REGULATION (1988); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regu-
latory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994).
193. See Shapiro, supra note 192, at 9-10, 13-15 (noting the institutional difficulties limit-
ing effective congressional oversight).
194. The OMB has played a crucial role in White House oversight of administrative agencies
at least since the Reagan administration promulgated executive orders providing OMB with that
authority. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50
Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985). Subsequent Presidents have promulgated similar orders that, while alter-
ing some of the details of OMB's role, retain OMB's basic oversight authority. See Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
195. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989).
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administrative agency.96 Third, the "framework of legal rules"'97 enacted to
protect the environment quite often includes provisions authorizing citi-
zen-initiated lawsuits to force a recalcitrant agency to comply with its
statutory mandate. '9' Such provisions thus provide a virtual voice that can
seek to influence administrative decisions through the threat or reality of
judicial enforcement. Through these means, politically responsive groups
can attempt to ensure that the political value of environmental
preservation is appropriately credited in "the vast hallways of
the... bureaucracy." 199
Finally, a statute may explicitly structure the administrative process so
as to take account of trust conservation values. For example, the federal
Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires that federal action that may cause
the extinction of a species be approved by a committee of agency heads.200
This committee consists of the heads of several agencies, sitting ex officio,
as well as a temporary membership for an individual from the affected
state.20' Among the agencies provided with a seat at the table are the Envi-
196. In fact, a number of state governors have issued executive orders requiring enhanced
environmental awareness in state agency decision making. See Sive, supra note 188, at 1214
(Appendix).
197. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 631.
198. The constitutionality of citizen suits against the government alleging as the basis for
standing only the citizen-suit provision and a general interest that the government act according
to the law, has been called into question by the Supreme Court's decision inLujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In Lujan, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
under the statutory citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) when the only
injury they could allege was a "procedural injury" from the government's improper application of
the law, based only on the citizen suit's provision that any citizen could sue the government to
enjoin it from violating any provision of the ESA. See id. at 571-78. The majority opinion sug-
gested that such provisions might be unconstitutional whenever the plaintiff could not show a
separate, "concrete" interest of its own. See id. at 576-77. A concurrence by two members of the
six-member majority, however, left the door open for greater congressional latitude in identifying
the injury in such a way as to allow a court to conclude that the plaintiffs had suffered an injury
of the sort required by Article Ill's standing requirements. See id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). For more information aboutLujan's possible con-
sequences, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 223-35 (1992).
199. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cit. 1971); see Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal
Statutes and Planetary Programs: How EPA Has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 253, 287 (1993) (arguing that citizen enforcement compensates for the EPA's lack of ade-
quate resources and capture).
200. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1994).
201. See id. § 1536(e)(3) (identifying the members of the committee to be the Secretary of
Agriculture, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and an individual from the affected state).
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ronmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The clear intent of this structure is to provide a voice for
preservation interests in decisions to trump the act's otherwise strict pres-
ervationist bent. Even more striking is a Mississippi law, discussed by
Sax,20 2 which required not only that oyster dredging in state-trust waters be
approved by a state commission, but that any such approval include the
affirmative vote of the commission's marine biologist member .20  Both of
these structures require that trust-impairing decisions be made only after
consideration (or, in the case of the Mississippi law, the actual approval) of
what can be viewed as the public trust resource's "virtual voice."
Thus, methods-though imperfect-exist for ensuring that admin-
istrative agencies vindicate political values. 2°4 This fact only increases the
justification required for process-justified protection for public trust inter-
ests: how can stringent judicial scrutiny of trust-impairing decisions be
justified as process-correcting when environmental protection is politically
popular and the means exist to translate that political popularity into
influence over agency action?
Ultimately, process theory has no satisfactory answer to this question.
As noted above, 205 Ely skirts the issue. The evasion is understandable
because political success neither does nor should correlate precisely with
206the ideas underlying equal protection doctrine. As Ackerman notes,
even under a perfectly functioning political system (indeed, perhaps
especially under such a system), no minority can expect to win every
battle. On the other hand, in many imperfect systems some minorities can
win a significant number of battles.0 7 This cannot mean, however, that as
soon as a minority wins a few battles it should no longer be considered a
candidate for judicial solicitude, or in equal protection parlance, a "suspect
class. 20 8 Ely's theory simply has no answer to this argument. This failure
202. See Sax, supra note 3, at 555.
203. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-15-49 (1972) (originally designated as MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 6048-03 (Supp. 1968)) (repealed 1974).
204. See also supra note 190 (discussing the existence of these oversight techniques at the
state level).
205. See supra note 183.
206. See Ackerman, supra note 18.
207. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 18, at 151-52 (noting the electoral success of African
Americans).
208. See, e.g., id. at 151-52 (noting the increasing political power of African Americans but
concluding that discrete and insular minority analysis must nevertheless protect that group). For
an example of the confusion surrounding the relationship between political success and suspect
class status, compare High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuality is not a suspect class in part because of success of
legislative efforts to combat antihomosexual discrimination), with High Tech Gays v. Defense
has especially serious consequences in the public trust context, since, again,
environmental conservation fares quite well in the political process. The
consequences of this failure are increased even more given the uncertain
legal foundation for the public trust doctrine. By contrast, suspect class
theory at least has as a foundation the Fourteenth Amendment's textual
commitment to equal protection.'09
The difficulties noted above suggest that the equal protection-based
analogy has foundered. Accordingly, the remainder of this Article con-
siders other bases for a public trust doctrine that authorizes judicial scrutiny
of government's decision-making processes.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING
A. The Need for a Substantive Value of Public Trust Protection
So far, so bad. The attempt to superimpose a suspect class type of
analysis on the public trust doctrine, even if theoretically sound, appears to
founder on several points when suspect class analysis is actually applied.
The first problem is the elusiveness of standards governing the deter-
mination whether a government decision is characterized by inappropriate
discounting of public trust values. Moreover, methods that do logically
indicate when such discounting has occurred do not seem susceptible to
principled limitations on the judicial role. Second, public trust resources,
and environmental conservation generally, are far from the pariah or out-
sider status normally associated with suspect classes. Indeed, this political
popularity has resulted not only in substantive protection, but also in the
creation of processes by which public trust resources enjoy effective virtual
advocacy in decision-making circles. Finally, stringent judicial scrutiny of
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377-78 (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (arguing that the legislative successes discussed by the panel opinion do not necessarily
mean that homosexuals are not a suspect class). See also United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264, 2296 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against considering gender as suspect classifi-
cation on the grounds that women constitute a majority of the electorate and have been the
beneficiary of significant amounts of federal legislation).
209. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (contrasting the Supreme Court's abortion rights
jurisprudence with the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), on the grounds
that while both abortion and interracial marriage may have been traditionally proscribed, enact-
ment of "an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial equality as a constitutional
value" justifies the result in Loving without supporting the result in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
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trust-impairing decisions seems to enjoy no legitimizing basis akin to the
textual mandate of the Equal Protection Clause.
At this stage, analogies between the public trust doctrine and equal
protection law fail. Most importantly, the idea that has carried the discus-
sion much of the way so far, Ely's idea of empathy, fails to resolve the
problems noted above. Recall that in Ely's theory, empathy assists in the
identification of discrete and insular minorities and thus helps inform
judicial decisions about which legislation should be subject to heightened
scrutiny.210 Earlier,"' this Article suggested that Ely's idea of empathy
could be analogized to governmental decision making affecting public trust
resources through an idea of "bureaucratic empathy," which inquired
whether the decision-making structure allowed consideration of resource-
conservation interests. This analogy allowed a transfer of Ely's insights
regarding suspect class doctrine onto public trust decision making, avoiding
both the conceptual difficulty inherent in speaking of empathy for non-
human objects as well as the problem that trust-impairing decisions are
usually made not directly by the legislature, but by administrative agencies.
Nevertheless, the concept of bureaucratic empathy cannot resolve the
problems noted above. Reliance on this idea as the criterion for deter-
mining when a court should carefully scrutinize a resource-impairing deci-
sion would lead to an enormous scope for essentially standardless judicial
intervention in governmental decision making. This problem mirrors one
of the major criticisms of Ely's theory. Just as use of the idea of empathy
generates this objection in the public trust analysis, so too critics have
-argued that Ely's theory provides no value-neutral basis on which to justify
strict scrutiny in the equal protection context."' Ely himself recognizes the
challenge and argues that the legislation should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny when it burdens a group that continually loses in the political process
"for reasons that in some sense are discreditable." ' Ely characterizes as
"discreditable" those reasons that make it impossible for interest groups to
cooperate based on a true understanding of their interests.14
210. See ELY, supra note 18, at 160-61.
211. See supra Part ll.C.2.a.
212. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 18, at 737-40; Ortiz, supra note 183, at 735-41;
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1064-65 (1980) (arguing that Ely's analysis fails to provide a value-neutral rationale for
strict scrutiny); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely
to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-57 (1980).
213. ELY, supra note 18, at 152.
214. See id. at 153.
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Leaving aside the question of whether this rationale provides a value-
neutral basis for strict scrutiny of laws burdening racial and other groups,"'
it should be clear that this rationale does not suffice to justify such review
in the public trust context. Ely envisions as a goal a "perfect politics, ' in
which all groups know and promote their "true" interests by means of alli-
ances with other groups, unencumbered by, irrational prejudices or stereo-
types. This goal finds a distant echo in Sax's suggestion that the public
trust doctrine should aim at removing "imperfections in the legislative and
administrative process '  on resource issues. Nevertheless, Sax's sug-
gestion, like Ely's vision in the opinion of his critics, fails to recognize the
need for a substantive commitment to the underlying value-in the public
trust context, resource conservation. For how are we to conclude that the
democratic process is imperfect if we do not have a substantive baseline
value against which to judge it?2 ' The problem is even greater in the pub-
lic trust context, for three principal reasons. First, various legitimate goals
must be balanced whenever a decision is made to impair or protect a public
trust resource, making purely process-based flaws more difficult to219
uncover. Second, the environment's political popularity, and the exis-
tence of means for translating that popularity into influence over
administrative decision making, casts doubt on the premise that systemic
"imperfections" in the process actually exist. Third, the uncertain legal
foundation for the doctrine makes a speculative process-based flaw that
much more difficult to defend against a charge of inappropriately intrusive
judicial review.
Sax's characterization of the modern public trust doctrine never fully
confronts this problem. His description of the doctrine envisions purely
procedural remedies (for example, the Wisconsin courts' requirement that
certain resource-impairing decisions be made at the state, as opposed to the
local, level) in support of a substantive goal-that is, some appropriate
ordering of trust preservation and trust impairment. Thus, he argues that
one approach of which he approves provides information allowing the leg-
islature to determine "the optimum public interest," 22o and refers to the
215. See supra note 212.
216. The term is taken from Ortiz. See supra note 183, at 721.
217. Sax, supra note 3, at 509.
218. Cf. Tribe, supra note 212, at 1077-78 (suggesting that equal participation in the politi-
cal process, rather than being a value-neutral goal that process theory can attempt to promote,
can also be conceived of as a substantive value choice).
219. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 894-95 (arguing that environmental issues
inherently require trade-offs between legitimate goals).
220. Sax, supra note 3, at 518.
interplay of judicial, legislative, and executive influence over resource-
allocation decisions as "a powerful force for more informed and rational
decision making. ' 2. Despite the technocratic flavor of his comments, the
general thrust of Sax's analysis remains toward politics, that is, political
ordering, choices, and access. For Sax, a major goal of the doctrine is to
"equalize" the political playing field in order to ensure that pro-trust inter-
ests be able to attempt to influence the decisionmaers." While such an
equalization may indeed result in more protection for trust resources, with-
out more such a result cannot be characterized as anything but a political
shift.223
If there is to be justification for stringent judicial review under the
public trust doctrine, it must therefore be found in some theory that
accords a substantive preference for the preservation of public trust
resources. The remainder of this Article examines possible sources for this
substantive preference.
B. The Public Trust as Public Property
One source of a substantive pro-trust value may be found in the theory
of inherently public property. According to Carol Rose, nineteenth-
century American courts used doctrines such as prescription, custom, and
(especially after Illinois Central) the public trust doctrine to find roadways
and rivers to be inherently public property because of their commerce-
enhancing functions.224 As interpreted by Rose, those decisions reflected a
conclusion that the highest use of those resources lay in public ownership,
open to public use. No compensation was required, as this "condemnation"
was not the act of organized government, but rather of the unorganized
221. Id.at551.
222. See, e.g., id. at 557-65.
223. There is another explanation, namely, that there is a substantive commitment, enforce-
able by the courts, to the pluralist political bazaar on all issues. This explanation motivates at
least some of the developments in administrative law since the 1970s and finds expression in the
interest-group theory of administrative law. See generally Stewart, Reformation, supra note 129.
However, without a substantive commitment to a particular value (in this case, resource preser-
vation), this theory cannot justify more stringent scrutiny than is afforded administrative action
generally. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (prohibiting federal courts from imposing more stringent procedural
requirements on an agency based on the court's perception of the social importance of the sub-
ject of the agency action). But cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) (narrowly construing the agency's discretion under a statute based in part on a conflict
between the agency's primary mission and the statute's purpose).
224. See Rose, supra note 28, at 731-49.
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public, appropriating resources that were then deemed public by virtue of
one of the three theories noted above.
As Rose observes, the link between these early public trust cases and
more modem ones is not the minor commercial use that public trust
resources might have today, such as the public's right to harvest oysters
from a bed that would otherwise be an individual's private property."
Instead, the real analogy is to the socializing and democratizing effects that
commerce was thought to have in the nineteenth century (and still may
have today) and that recreation may have today.2 6 Under this analysis, the
social benefits created by public ownership of and/or access to a resource
may justify scrutiny of government decisions to alienate such resources, or
at least scrutiny of the procedure by which those decisions are reached.
Certainly, courts have evaluated the relative value of this use of property,
deciding, for example, that property is "used" for a charitable purpose even
when the owner leaves it in its natural state because, according to the
court, the property has significant value as undisturbed virgin land." 7 It
has been suggested that this conception of the public trust doctrine renders
it the mirror image of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment since
both ensure that property be put to its most valuable use.22 If so, then
some sort of judicial scrutiny may be justified to ensure that a decision to
alienate a trust resource not result in the transfer of a resource to a private
party that will use it in a way less valuable than its use as public property.
Nevertheless, this analysis raises as many questions as it answers.
While it arguably provides a general idea about when judicial scrutiny, is
appropriate, it does not offer any detailed guidance for courts engaging in
this scrutiny. Indeed, at least one economist has questioned the work-
ability of a calculus designed to measure the competing private and public
trust uses of property." 9 In addition, another commentator has expressed
concern about an institutional judicial bias in favor of public trust uses at
the expense of private property rights. 3°
225. Cf. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 65-78 (1821) (relying on the public trust doctrine to
restrict a private party's ability to own oyster beds submerged in a river).
226. See Rose, supra note 28, at 777-81. At least one commentator has questioned the
socializing or democratizing role of such public property, although he suggests that such property
has at least symbolic value as a commons. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 887.
227. See Turner v. Trust for Pub. Land, 445 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 1984) ("[W]ithout ques-
tion [the parcel at issue] serves the greatest public good if left in its natural state.... [l]t is an
important element in the ecological balance of east-central Florida .... By holding the land in its
natural state, the greatest public good was achieved.").
228. See generally Epstein, supra note 124, at 417-22.
229. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 247-49.
230. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 911-12.
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Sax has offered some guidance for judicial consideration of these
issues. Sax identifies four questions courts have asked in the past when
considering public trust-based challenges to government resource-
allocation decisions. The first three are especially relevant here. The first
asks whether "public property [has] been disposed of at less than market
value under circumstances which indicate that there is no very obvious
reason for the grant of a subsidy."23' The second questions whether "the
government [has] granted to some private interest the authority to make
resource-use decisions which may subordinate broad public resource uses to
that private interest." 3' The third inquires whether "there [has] been an
attempt to reallocate diffuse public uses either to private uses or to public
uses which have less breadth."2"
Sax interprets these questions as addressing concerns about resource
misallocation. The first asks, quite straightforwardly, whether the resource-
allocation decision makes economic sense or is justified by a policy need to
grant a subsidy. This concern with unjustified below-market government
grants also reflects a suspicion that the resource's value may have been
inappropriately discounted in the decision-making process. The second
and third questions shift the focus away from the value to the public of
alienating the resource (expressed either as the sale or rental price of the
property or the public value of the subsidized private activity), and toward
the public cost of such alienation, by examining the extent to which the
government's decision impairs the previous public trust character of the
234
resource.
These criteria provide a more precise, if still relatively rough, guide as
to when the "reverse takings clause" aspect of the doctrine 21 may justify
231. Sax, supra note 3, at 562.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 563.
234. Sax's fourth criterion relates to this analysis, but only tangentially and quite possibly in
a way that undercuts some of his previous analysis. This criterion asks "whether the resource is
being used for its natural purpose-whether, for example, a lake is being used 'as a lake."' Id. at
565. Sax suggests that this criterion also speaks to the question of reallocation of a resource from
a broad public use to a narrower one, the surrogates for broad and narrow uses being,
respectively, "natural" uses and "unnatural" ones. This relationship does not seem logically
compelling, however, at least when natural uses war not with commercial development or non-
"environmental" uses, but instead with "environmental development"-for example, the provi-
sion of more public access into previously remote wilderness areas. In such a case, the unnatural
use may well lead to more use by the public than the natural use (except as the public may reap
hedonic value just by knowing the natural, unspoiled-and inaccessible-area is there).
235. The analogy to the takings clause should be briefly examined here. The point of that
clause, of course, is not just to empower government to convert private property to a higher use
as public property, but to ensure, through the compensation requirement, that the public use is in
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judicial scrutiny, that is, when a court should be concerned that a
resource's highest use-as a public resource-is about to be destroyed.
236
Moreover, his idea of "diffuse interests"' suggests a link to the
"unorganized public" aspect of Rose's historical analysis. Indeed, the com-
bination of these two ideas suggests a possible way out of the substantive-
value conundrum that has plagued much of this analysis. The idea is that
there is a substantive value underlying the public trust doctrine-namely,
that there is substantial worth in the unorganized public's custody of a
resource-and that the nature of this value as inhering in a diffuse group
makes judicial intervention necessary, given the difficulty of effectuating
that interest in the political-administrative process.23 8
So stated, the justification for judicial review has an ironic relation-
ship to Ely's theory of equal protection. For, the diffuseness of the
fact a more valuable use. To the extent that courts employ the public trust doctrine to convert
previously private property rights to public property without compensation, this "highest use"
goal is not guaranteed, as the value of the conversion is not tested against the market value of
the property. Cf. Thompson, supra note 38, at 909 (noting that other problems are created when
courts employ the public trust doctrine to limit private property rights). Still, the characteriza-
tion of the doctrine as a "reverse takings clause" does hold when the question is whether the
government is allowed to alienate a resource into private hands; in this situation, the court's
application of Sax's criteria can be viewed as performing the same value comparison as the com-
pensation requirement of the takings clause when property is moving from private to public
ownership.
236. Because this scrutiny looks toward a process remedy, that is, a judicial decision that
does not purport to review the actual outcome, the theory sketched in this Article does not need
to answer the questions posed by Thompson regarding the particular rules the court should
employ in reviewing the substance of the challenged governmental actions. See Thompson,
supra note 38, at 888-90 (discussing what resources should be included in this sort of "commons
trust;" what types of rights the public should enjoy in the protected lands; and the circumstances,
if any, under which the government should be able to remove resources from their protected
status as trust resources).
237. Sax, supra note 3, at 563.
238. Rose's and Sax's conceptions are not perfectly coterminous. Rose's conception of
"inherently public property" applies to all property, regardless of whether it is held by the gov-
ernment or by a private person. With government-owned property, her conception of inherently
public property would presumably justify the retention of such property in government hands and
open to the public, despite government attempts to alienate it. This is also Sax's conception.
With privately owned property, Rose's theory would justify a judicial determination that the
land, or at least some right to use the land, had passed from private to public ownership, under a
theory of custom, prescription, or public trust. Sax also seems to believe that the doctrine limits
both governmental and private-party owners of trust resources, but his process-based view of the
doctrine appears to be limited to governmental owners. By comparison, in the case of private
owners, at least owners of water rights, Sax simply views those rights as limited in the sense that
they do not include a right to use water in ways that do not serve current conceptions of the
public interest. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L.
473,475 (1989).
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interest-the characteristic that makes it most in need of judicial
protection-also makes it quite dissimilar to the sort of discrete and insular
minority Ely discusses. On the other hand, empirical observation suggests
that large but diffuse interests quite often seem to be the sort systematically
undervalued by the political process; indeed, scholars have relied on this
insight in calling for a reconceptualization of suspect class analysis." 9
Nevertheless, this analysis does not provide criteria cabining the
judicial role. The problem, again, is that a large number of interests
probably fit under the characterization "widely held but diffuse;" indeed, at
one point Sax notes that his process-based public trust analysis would apply
to areas as disparate as consumer protection and legislation affecting the
poor.' Presumably, this analysis would justify judicial review in any area
in which the government transfers some sort of right to a private party
under circumstances raising suspicion that public rights are being sacrificed
to rent-seeking interests without a countervailing increase in public
welfare. This sort of situation could be expected to appear whenever the
public's interest can be described as diffuse."' Thus, even this analysis
raises, once again, the spectre of searching judicial review of a wide range
of administrative action, since in most cases a colorable case can be made
that the decision-making process is structured so as to undervalue diffuse
interests.
We are thus back to where we started, without a theory explaining
why public trust resources are so special as to justify judicial scrutiny
beyond the normal review of an agency's decision-making process242 and
239. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 18, at 742 (arguing that diffuse majorities, such as
women, should be brought into equal protection analysis); id. at 723-24 (arguing more generally
that the insularity of a group, far from being a criterion of suspectness, actually aids that group's
political power). For a brief discussion of the empirical evidence, see Thompson, supra note 38,
at 891-92, 910-11.
240. See Sax, supra note 3, at 557; see also Stewart, Lessons, supra note 129, at 721 (noting
that agency interest-bias analysis theoretically applies to any number of policy issues).
241. For example, this sort of situation probably describes much United States foreign trade
policy, in which organized domestic interests (usually manufacturers or labor unions) succeed in
influencing government decisions to protect domestic industry and thereby impose a cost on the
general public that is not outweighed by the aggregate benefit the protected industry receives.
See generally Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, The Multifiber Arrangement: "Temporary" Protec-
tion Run Amuck, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51, 81-98 (1987) (describing the domestic textile
industry's political success in obtaining protection from foreign competition); id. at 155-61
(discussing the costs of the textile industry protection to American consumers).
242. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (setting forth the appropriate judicial review of an agency's decision-
making process under informal notice-and-comment procedures under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act).
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the decision's substantive rationality."' Where is the substantive commit-
ment to the preservation of public trust resources?
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
This part of the Article suggests that state constitutional provisions
dealing with the environment can furnish the substantive commitment to
resource conservation that, in turn, justifies judicial application of the
public trust doctrine. The constitutions of approximately two-thirds of the
fifty states include provisions that, in some way or another, aim at the pro-
tection of natural resources.244  hile these provisions vary widely in the
scope and type of protection they provide, none has formed the basis for
serious judicial protection of public trust resources. This Article suggests
the possibility of a symbiotic relationship between these provisions and the
process-based public trust doctrine sketched above: while the former pro-
vide the substantive political value justifying special judicial solicitude for
public trust resources, the latter provides an analytical method, and a justi-
fication for that method, that allows courts to engage in this review while
respecting the technical and ultimately political nature of the challenged
decisions. This part reviews courts' treatment of these types of provisions
and then considers which types lend themselves to an interpretation incor-
porating this Article's process-based analysis. It will then consider whether
the existence of nonconstitutional state law enactments, specifically, state
law versions of NEPA, moots a public trust gloss on these constitutional
provisions. I.
243. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (establishing and applying the appropriate level of review of the substance of an agency's
decision made pursuant to informal notice-and-comment procedures under the federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act).
244. See ALA. CONST. amend. 395, 543, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. VIII; ARK. CONST.
amend. 35, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. X, §§ 2, 3; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6, art. XXVII, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 7, art. X, §§ 11, 16; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, 9 2; HAW. CONST. arts. VII, IX,
XI, XII; IDAHO CONST. art. XV; ILL. CONST. art. XI; LA. CONST. art. IX; ME. CONST. art. IX,§ 23; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLIX, § 179; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; MINN. CONST. art.
XI, § 14; MO. CONST. art. Ill, § 37(b), (c), (e); MONT. CONST. arts. II, § 3, IX; NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 20; NEV. CONST. art. IX, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1;
N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 36; OKLA. CONST. art. XXVI, § 4; OR.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 19; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; UTAH
CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. XI; WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art.
XVI, § 10. Many of these provisions are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this Article.
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A. State Constitutional Provisions and Their Treatment by the Courts
Courts have consistently refused to interpret the Constitution as pro-
viding protection to natural resources or a general right to a clean envi-
ronment. 245  However, approximately two-thirds of state constitutions do
speak in some way to environmental concerns. Although these provisions
vary widely, they can be described as falling into seven types, presented
here in rough order from the weakest to the strongest protection afforded
the environment: (1) authorizations for legislative action (normally for
preservation activities or the contracting of indebtedness to pay for
preservation); (2) creation of a decision-making body charged with
resource preservation; (3) creation of a trust fund or other funding mechan-
ism for preservation purposes; (4) broad statements of a state's pro-
preservation policy or directions to the legislature to protect certain
resources; (5) restrictions on the legislature's power to alienate certain
resources; (6) establishment of certain resources as the public domain; and
(7) conferrals of a right to a clean environment on individuals.
The record thus far is not encouraging to those who had hoped that
state constitutions could be used to provide significant environmental pro-
tection. When confronted with legal challenges alleging violations of
these provisions, courts have generally either held that the provisions are
not self-executing, or, if self-executing, that they embody such a lenient
standard of review of the challenged action as to provide no legally inde-
pendent grounds for scrutinizing the challenged action.246 Nevertheless,
the remainder of this Article suggests that several categories of these
provisions can be reasonably read so as to provide a basis for judicial appli-
cation of the process-based public trust doctrine previously outlined.
1. Legislative and Administrative Authorizations
The first two types of constitutional provisions identified above,
authorizations of legislative action and creation of natural resource deci-
sion-making bodies, provide the least secure foundations for the type of
judicial scrutiny previously described. Authorizations of legislative action
to protect public trust resources merely make explicit the existence of legis-
245. See Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, The Doctrine of Self-Execution and the Environmental Provisions
of the Montana State Constitution: "They Mean Something," 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 219, 230 &
n.116 (1994).
246. See generally, id.
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lative power that undoubtedly exists already as part of the legislature's gen-
eral powers.247  Similarly, provisions establishing a decision-making body
responsible for resource conservation, to the extent they do not require
particular actions or actions pursuant to a policy set forth in the consti-
tution, can be viewed as mirrors of legislative authorization provisions. Just
as legislative authorization provisions simply authorize the legislature to
act, provisions establishing decision-making bodies merely delegate this
power, in greater or lesser part, to these newly created bodies.
The key point here is that neither type of provision sets forth a policy
that the government's decisions must reflect. The lack of such a binding
policy makes the provisions susceptible to the conclusion that they provide
no rights that can be enforced by a court, that is, are not self-executing.
For example, in Sutter Hospital v. City of Sacramento,4 the California
Supreme Court held to be not self-executing a state constitutional
provision that read, in relevant part, that the "Legislature may exempt
from taxation all or any portion of property used exclusively
for ... hospital . . . purposes .... ,,249 At one level, the rationale for the
court's holding is quite straightforward: by definition, a nonmandatory
provision such as this one does not require the government to act or refrain
from acting in any particular way, and thus cannot provide an aggrieved
party with a right that a court could enforce. Indeed, the court in Sutter
Hospital described this provision as "purely permissive, ' ' O noting that under
it, "the Legislature could refrain from exempting any of the property
referred to in the amendment or it could exempt only such property-as
might meet the conditions specified in the amendment and such further
conditions as the Legislature might see fit to impose."2 '' Underlying this
straightforward reading of the provision, though, is an understanding that,
as a matter of separation of powers, the provision commits to the legislature
247. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 871. Such provisions would have more signifi-
cance if they freed the legislature to act without concern over consequences mandated by other
parts of the constitution-for example, if they authorized the legislature to preserve public trust
resources without the need for compensating property owners for property taken in the process.
See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. These provisions, however, almost uniformly do not include
such features. More commonly, such authorizing provisions merely purport to grant the legisla-
ture the power to act in this area. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, 9[ 2(a) ("[Wlithout limita-
tion of the powers granted under Paragraph I, the General Assembly shall have the power to
provide by law for: (1) Restrictions upon land use in order to protect and preserve the natural
resources, environment, and vital areas of this state.").
248. 244 P.2d 390 (Cal. 1952).
249. Id. at 391 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XI1, § 1(c)).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 392.
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the discretion to determine when the public good demands such exemp-
tions and when it does not.
Legislative and administrative authorizations reflect a similar com-
mitment of discretion to bodies other than courts. These provisions
cannot reasonably be read as embodying the political commitment in favor
of resource conservation needed to support judicial embrace of the public
trust doctrine.
2. Policy Statements
The fourth category2 of constitutional provisions, statements setting
forth a state's pro-preservation policy, provide a stronger foundation for the
public trust doctrine."' By setting forth a substantive policy, these pro-
visions go farther than mere legislative authorizations toward providing a
judicially discernible rule that a court could then interpret and enforce.
Still, courts construing such provisions have held them to be non-self-
executing. For example, in Robb v. Shockoe Slip Foundation,5 4 the Virginia
Supreme Court held to be non-self-executing Virginia's constitutional pro-
vision establishing a state- policy in favor of historic preservation. 5 The
court noted both the important substantive and procedural questions the
provision left unanswered 5 6 and the fact that the following section of the
same article of the constitution authorized the legislature to act to
implement the policy. 5 '7 These concerns reflect traditional self-execution
analysis, which considers provisions to be non-self-executing if they are
vaguely worded5 s or commit implementation of the mandate to the
252. The third category of provisions, which establishes funding mechanisms for resource-
conservation purposes, is discussed infra note 262.
253. For examples of such provisions, see ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 7; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.M. CONST.
art. XX, § 21; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 19; VA. CONST. art. Xl, § 1.
254. 324 S.E.2d 674 (Va. 1985).
255. That provision-article XI, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution-reads as follows:
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment for
recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop and utilize its natural resources, its
public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall be the Common-
wealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment,
or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the
Commonwealth.
VA. CONST. art. Xl, § 1.
256. See Robb, 324 S.E.2d at 676.
257. See id. at 676-77.
258. See, e.g., John L. Horwich, Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions:
Self-Execution or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 337-38 (1996) (discussing the traditional
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legislature.2 9 At least one other state court construing an environmental
policy provision has reached a similar conclusion. 260
Nevertheless, such provisions, which express the fundamental pref-
erences of the state's citizenry261 but that neither commit the government
to take a particular action nor establish legal rights, seem particularly ame-
nable to a process-based analysis. It is in such a fluid legal regime, char-
acterized by a fundamental political commitment to a broadly worded
policy, that courts are at their most legitimate in ensuring that government
decisions affecting the environment take trust resources into account while
disclaiming any authority to pass judgment on the substance of the final
action.2 62 The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided an example of this
type of analysis of a policy statement type of constitutional provision. In
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission,2 61 the
self-execution doctrine); see also In re V, 306 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Mo. 1957) (holding that a con-
stitutional provision is not self-executing if its terms are "so vague as not to admit of an under-
standing of its intended scope"); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 366 (Tenn. 1927) (concluding
that a constitutional provision is unenforceable by the court if it is too vague); cf. Miller v.
Police Jury, 74 So. 2d 394, 398 (La. 1954) (rejecting the argument that the terms of the state
constitutional provision were so vague as to be non-self-executing).
259. See Horwich, supra note 258, at 336-37; see also Brooksbank v. Roane County, 341
S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tenn. 1960) (noting that the right of eminent domain in the Tennessee Con-
stitution "is not self-executing but leaves it to the Legislature to determine the method of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and the manner of compensation or remedy"); Shields v.
Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 928 (Vt. 1995) ("Ordinarily a self-executing provision does not contain
a directive to the legislature for further action.").
260. See County of Delta v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 325 N.W.2d 455, 457
(Mich. 1982) (concluding that a constitutional provision stating that "conservation of the natu-
ral resources of the state is a paramount concern" is not self-executing until the legislature enacts
a law implementing it).
261. The fundamental nature of state constitutional provisions is called somewhat into
question by the insertion of relatively mundane provisions more appropriate for statutory enact-
ments, whose backers were able to muster the support necessary to enact as a (more difficult to
repeal) constitutional provision. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 38, at 915-18 (discussing the
problem of "constitutional hyperlegislation" and using as an example the California Constitu-
tion's detailed regulations on the use of certain fishing nets that injure noncommercial marine
life). Nevertheless, it should still be possible to distinguish between such "legislative" provisions
and more fundamental principles. Specifically, it is reasonable to characterize as fundamental
broad statements of a state constitution's pro-preservation policy, even when those statements
appear in a document replete with other provisions more appropriately found in statute books.
262. By contrast, the third category of provisions--creating funding mechanisms for
environmental-preservation purposes while also evincing this fundamental commitment to
resource conservation-is nevertheless so narrowly focused as to make such provisions inappro-
priate as foundations for the broad-ranging judicial review contemplated by this Article. For an
example of such a provision, see MINN. CONST. art. Xl, § 14.
263. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
court considered a provision in the state constitution that established a
policy of environmental conservation explicitly balanced against public
health, safety, and welfare. 264 The court concluded that this provision, as
well as state statutory law,"' required the government to determine that
adverse environmental impacts of proposed governmental action had been
minimized as much as possible consistent with the public welfare.
2
'
6
According to the court, this standard "require[d] a balancing process in
which environmental costs and benefits must be given full and careful
consideration along with economic, social and other factors." 67 The court
understood its primary role not as a second-guesser of the decisions made,
but instead as a guardian of the decision-making process in which envi-
ronmental interests were given fair consideration, based in large part'6s on
the policy enunciated in the constitutional provision. Applying the stan-
dard to the factual record of the case before it, the court concluded that it
could not determine if the governmental decisionmaker had understood
these legal requirements and therefore remanded the case.269
The opinion in Save Ourselves reflects this Article's view that the
most appropriate judicial role in resource conservation may be guardianship
of the process by which decisions affecting the environment are made. It
also supports the idea that policy statements in state constitutions can
serve as the legal bases for such review, by singling out environmental con-
servation as a goal to which the citizens of the state have made a fun-
264. See id. at 1154 & n.2 ("The natural resources of the state... shall be protected, conserved,
and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.
The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.") (quoting LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1).
265. Specifically, the court relied on the Louisiana Environmental Affairs Act (LEAA), LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1051-1150.96 (West 1979) (redesignated as the Louisiana Envi-
ronmental Quality Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2001-2391 (West 1989)), the state's
equivalent to the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court concluded, in
fact, that the LEAA represented the legislature's satisfaction of the Louisiana Constitution arti-
cle IX, section 1 command that the legislature implement section ls environmental con-
servation policy. See Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1154-55. Nevertheless, the court viewed the
constitutional provision's policy statement as providing distinct legal content, most notably by
incorporating the public trust doctrine. See id. at 1158 (finding distinct legal content in article
IX, section 1); id. at 1156 (concluding that article IX, section 1 "imposes a duty of envi-
ronmental protection on all state agencies and officials [and] establishes a standard of envi-
ronmental protection"); id. at 1154 (holding that article IX, section 1 incorporated the public
trust doctrine). For discussion of the more general issue of state NEPA analogues' affect on this
Article's constitutional analysis, see infra Part IV.B. 1.
266. See Save Ourselves, 452 So. 2d at 1157.
267. Id.
268. The court reached this conclusion based on the standard of review applicable to deci-
sions subject to both the LEAA and article IX, section 1. See id. at 1159.
269. Seeid.atll6l.
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damental commitment. Other state court decisions reflect the same idea in
different factual contexts. 270 In this sort of case, it is the commitment to
environmental conservation, reflected in a policy statement, that justifies
stricter-than-normal judicial review.
A number of these policy statements feature a provision charging the
legislature with authority to carry out the policy."' This feature might be
viewed as limiting judicial willingness to rely on these provisions, on the
theory that the provision should be viewed as directed to the legislature,
with a concomitant requirement that deference be paid to the legislature's
decisions on how to comply. For example, in Forseth v. Sweet,"' a
Wisconsin citizen asserted a constitutional right to sue the state in tort
based on a provision of the state constitution that read, "The legislature
shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought
against the state."27 Despite this provision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
refused to allow the tort plaintiff to sue the state because the legislature
had not enacted legislation on this issue. The court acknowledged that the
legislature "ha[d] been remiss in its failure to implement" the provision,2
74
but concluded that the provision gave the legislature a great deal of dis-
cretion in determining the best method by which to implement it. The
court concluded that this discretion removed from the courts any power to
enforce the provision's bare, unimplemented terms.17 ' Thus, even when
the court could have enforced the constitutional provision without a direct
conflict with the legislature (for instance, here, by simply recognizing a
cause of action and developing jurisdictional and procedural rules to
implement the constitutional command), respect for the legislature's role
in implementing the provision led the court to decline to do so. In the
field of natural resource decision making, courts might be expected to be
even more deferential to the legislature given the technical complexity and
difficult policy trade-offs involved.
Nevertheless, courts have relied on constitutional provisions estab-
lishing a pro-conservation policy even when those provisions have charged
270. See, e.g., Seadade Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1971)
(holding that the Florida Constitution's statement of pro-conservation policy justifies the con-
sideration of environmental protection as a required factor in condemnation proceedings).
271. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("The public policy of the State... is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations. The General
Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforcement of this public policy.");
see also FLA. CONST. art II, § 7; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52.
272. 158 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1968).
273. Id. at 371 (quoting WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27).
274. Id. at 376.
275. See id. at 376-77.
the legislature with their implementation. For example, the provision
relied on by the Save Ourselves court expressly charged the state legislature
with the duty to enact laws implementing the pro-conservation policy.
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has relied on the Florida Con-
stitution's environmental policy provision, which sets forth a pro-
conservation policy but also requires that the provision for pollution
abatement "be made by law," as support for its consideration of environ-
mental factors in condemnation cases.276
Judicial reliance on such provisions makes sense because those pro-
visions do not simply charge the legislature with enacting laws on a given
subject, but also establish a substantive state policy, albeit a broadly worded
one. Thus, there should be no separation of powers reason prohibiting
courts from taking note of this fundamental state policy, so long as the
judicial action was otherwise within the competence of the courts. In the
Louisiana and Florida cases noted above, the courts' actions-respectively,
reviewing an administrative agency's decision and deciding an eminent
domain claim-were clearly within their competence. On the other hand,
the vagueness of these provisions could be an obstacle to their judicial
enforcement.27 7 It is here, however, that this Article's proposal that the
judicial role be limited to imposing a process remedy 278 becomes useful, by
ensuring, as in Save Ourselves, that courts do not second-guess the sub-
stantive governmental decision. This limited scope for judicial action
avoids the lack of legitimacy that would attend substantive judicial review
purportedly based on vaguely worded provisions such as these con-
stitutional policy statements.
3. Limits on Government Authority
A number of state constitutional provisions impose a substantive limit
on governmental action affecting the environment. These provisions vary
279in form from grants of individual rights to a clean environment, 7 to the
denomination of some or all of the state's natural resources as property
276. See Seadade Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1971); see
also 1969-1970 MICH. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 17 (noting that a constitutional provision,
declaring a state policy valuing natural resources, prohibits the legislature from enacting any law
which would violate that policy).
277. See Horwich, supra note 258, at 337-38 (noting vagueness as a concern in traditional
self-execution analysis).
278. See supra page 391.
279. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; MASS. CONST. amend.
XLIX, § 179; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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vested with some sort of public trust, 2s° to explicit restrictions on the gov-
ernment's authority to alienate certain resources."' However worded, the
provisions all share the characteristic of establishing an explicit limit on
governmental discretion to act in ways affecting the environment, by
establishing a new relationship between the government and either the
people of the state (as with the granting of rights to individuals) or the
resource itself (as with restrictions on the legislature's power to alienate
certain resources).
These provisions seem to be prime candidates for interpretation based
on the process-based principles previously discussed. Such provisions alter
the legal relationship between the government and the resource, or
between the government and the people of the state (third-party bene-• \282
ficiaries of the resource preservation). For example, in Payne v. Kassab,283
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution that declared the state's public natural resources to be a pub-
lic trust of which the state was a trustee created legal relationships that the
court had the power to defend. Moreover, because such provisions limit
the government's authority to act, they do not present the same separation
of powers obstacles to judicial enforcement as those provisions directing
the government to act.2 4
280. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("fish, wildlife, and waters"); HAW. CONST.
art. XI, § I ("all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources"); id.§ 6 ("[flisheries in the sea waters of the State not included in any fish pond, artificial enclosure or
state-licensed mariculture operation"); id. art. XII, § 4 (public land); MONT. CONST. art.-IX,§ 3(3) ("[alll surface, underground, flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the
state"); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (state's "public natural resources"); R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17(rights of "fishery, and the privileges of the shore" and "use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the state"); WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (state ownership of "beds and shores of all
navigable waters in the state").
281. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 23; MASS. CONST. amend.
XLIX, § 179.
282. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976) (holding that the state con-
stitutional provision dealing with the environment "creates a public trust of public natural
resources for the benefit of all the people (including future generations as yet unborn)").
283. !d.
284. The issue of public-school financing furnishes an illustrative example of the separation
of powers difficulties inherent when courts attempt to enforce provisions directing legislative
action. Courts attempting to require the legislature to develop an equitable public-school
financing scheme, growing out of court decisions finding such a requirement in state
constitutions, have had to balance their concern of enforcing this constitutional mandate with
the legislature's clear authority in this area. To take one example, the Texas Supreme Court
resorted to a classic "prohibitory" remedy: an injunction against further state use of the old
school-financing scheme after a particular time period designed to give the legislature a chance
to enact a new, constitutional scheme, combined with the implicit threat of future injunctions
should the legislature fail to enact an acceptable scheme. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). The court was explicit about the reason for its embrace of
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Nevertheless, the conclusion that such provisions can be judicially
enforced does not end the inquiry. Instead, it only raises the next ques-
tion-that of the level of scrutiny courts will employ. For example, in
Payne, the court, after determining that the constitutional provision at
issue was capable of judicial enforcement, went on to interpret it as requir-
ing judicial review exactly co-extensive with a Pennsylvania statute
establishing procedures with which the state had to comply before it could
proceed with that type of project." 5 To the extent that future cases might
deal with factual situations in which those statutory safeguards might not
apply, the state supreme court's opinion is unclear as to whether those
considerations would apply as constitutional requirements.2 1 Lower
Pennsylvania courts, however, have held that the constitutional provision
does not authorize an agency to take into consideration factors that its
authorizing statute does not mention."7
Even if the constitutional provision did include its own requirements,
the lower appellate court's statement of these requirements makes clear
that the requirements do not encompass particularly careful judicial scru-
tiny of administrative action. The intermediate appellate court in Payne
crafted a three-part test, examining whether: (1) there was compliance
with statutory and administrative law relevant to environmental protec-
tion; (2) the record demonstrated "a reasonable effort to reduce the envi-
ronmental incursion to a minimum;" and (3) the environmental harm so
outweighed the benefit from the action as to constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion. The state supreme court noted this test with apparent
approval.2 9 It is hard to disagree with the commentator who concluded
that the Payne test "strips the [Pennsylvania constitutional] provision of
much substantive impact."2'9
Payne reflects the problem courts will inevitably face if they attempt
to engage in a substantive review of agency action in areas as complex as
natural resource use. In turn, this difficulty illustrates the importance of
this rather indirect method of achieving compliance with the constitutional mandate: "The legis-
lature has primary responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient [school financing] sys-
tem. We decide only the nature of the constitutional mandate and whether that mandate has
been met." Id. at 399.
285. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273.
286. See id.
287. See, e.g., Snelling v. Department of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Precision Tube Co., 358 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. 1976); Community College v.
Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 482 (Pa. 1975).
288. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 361 A.2d at 263.
289. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273.
290. Horwich, supra note 258, at 364.
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the questions identified by Sax as relevant to judicial review of govern-
mental decision making.291 As noted above, 92 these questions attempt to
uncover situations in which the governmental decision gives rise to a sus-
picion of inappropriate discounting of trust conservation interests. When
considered as the means of giving content to an already-existing commit-
ment to trust resource preservation, Sax's questions can help a court
determine when it should demand that a government decisionmaker
defend the process by which the decision was reached. Unlike the Payne
test, this proposed test operates independently of any statutory mandate
that may limit agency action. However, as previously noted, 93 this pro-
posed test would not seek to second-guess the substantive decisions.
Instead, this test contemplates a remand to the agency as the appropriate
response. Thus, the constitutional commitment to government solicitude
for the environment would take the form of heightened judicial scrutiny of
the process by which decisions affecting the environment were made, with
the remand remedy available for agency procedures that failed the test.
This test has the effect of keeping the courts out of the business of deciding
the appropriate balance between environmental protection and competing
values-a balance the courts are ill-equipped to draw-while nevertheless
giving effect to unquestionable, if vague, political commitments to resource
preservation.
B. Does the Analysis Make Any Difference?
Two objections may be made at this point. First, it could be argued
that this analysis adds nothing to state statutory law, specifically, the "little
NEPA" state-law analogues to NEPA, which impose many of the require-
ments that this analysis would impose as a matter of state constitutional
law.' 94 Second, it could be argued that only a few states have the types of
constitutional provisions that may be susceptible to an interpretation
allowing this sort of process review. These objections must be met: the
analysis will have little practical impact if most states have statutes that
yield the same effect as this analysis or if few state constitutions contain
the provisions to which this analysis can apply.
291. See supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text.
292. See supra page 435.
293. See supra page 445.
294. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 685-88 (questioning the need for the public trust
doctrine in light of NEPA).
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1. Does this Analysis Add Anything to the Little NEPAs?
Sixteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have envi-
ronmental policy acts modeled on NEPA. 95 NEPA requires that the fed-
eral government consider the environmental consequences of any action it
might take that would have a significant effect on the environment, and
that it disclose those consequences.296 NEPA imposes essentially pro-
cedural requirements on the government; it does not require particular out-
comes, nor does it authorize courts reviewing government compliance with
NEPA to second-guess agencies' ultimate decisions to proceed with an
action.297 Most little NEPAs are similarly procedural.9
The requirements that little NEPAs impose on state governments
appear at first glance quite similar to those this Article suggests can be
derived from state constitutions. This should not be surprising: just as
NEPA and the little NEPAs reflect a governmental policy of envi-
ronmental conservation coupled with an acknowledgment of the need for
economic development,299 so too the constitutional provisions discussed in
this Article enunciate or reflect a broad, but not absolute, policy in favor of
environmental conservation.3°° Indeed, the little NEPAs may be viewed as
legislatures' implementation of the environmental conservation policies
embodied in their state constitutions. On the other hand, a number of
states whose constitutions establish such a policy do not have a little
NEPA 301 In these states, the constitutional policy would have to be effec-
tuated by the courts, without the benefit of implementing legislation.
Even in states with little NEPAs, the analysis suggested in this Article
may play an independent role. This analysis suggests a methodology by
which a court can determine which governmental decisions should arouse
judicial suspicion and thus receive heightened scrutiny. This methodology
295. See Sive, supra note 188.
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
297. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S.
87, 97-101 (1983).
298. See Sive, supra note 188, at 1194-95.
299. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1), (5) (1994) (reciting NEPA's goals of, among others,
"fulfill[ing] responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding gen-
erations," and "achiev[ing] a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities").
300. Indeed, many of these constitutional provisions explicitly acknowledge the need to
balance these competing considerations. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 1; N.M. CONST.
art. XX, § 21.
301. States in this category include Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas.
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is analogous to Rose's analysis of judicial decisions that found some osten-
sibly private property to be "inherently public,"' 2 and is illustrated by the
questions Sax suggests courts should ask when determining whether a par-
ticular resource-use decision was inappropriate. 303 This methodology allows
a court somewhat more flexibility in reviewing governmental action, by
allowing it to tailor that review to circumstances that may change over
time or that differ with the particular governmental action at issue. The
flexibility in turn makes this methodology particularly appropriate for con-
stitutionalization, as it allows for a dynamic adaptation of a fundamental
social value implemented by a governmental branch relatively more insu-
lated from day-to-day political pressures.
Equally importantly, it is significant that constitutional provisions are
part of a state's fundamental law. As such, they are beyond legislative
overruling in the normal course of legislative business and thus are less sus-
ceptible to legislative tinkering in the face of particular actions the legis-
lature may wish to authorize or prohibit. 4 Such tinkering can assume
various forms, such as amendments to the statute itself, subsequent limi-
tation of the statute's scope, "interpretation" of the statute by means of
subsequent legislation, 305 or enactment of legislation explicitly authorizing
or prohibiting certain action notwithstanding the requirements of more
general laws.' °6 To the extent such tinkering occurs exactly when con-
302. See supra text accompanying notes 224-228.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 231-234.
304. Cf. Thompson, supra note 38, at 915 (noting the increased stability of constitutional
provisions as compared with statutes).
305. Cf. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
§ 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon
and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to
contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the[preexisting] statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases cap-
tioned Seattle Audubon Society et al. v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washing-
ton Contract Loggers Assoc. et al. v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting
preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al. v. Manuel Lujan,
Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR.
Id. This statute, which under one reading clearly purports to interpret preexisting statutes, see
Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cit. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992),
was held not to violate the judicial role in the separation of powers scheme. See Robertson
v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 437 (1992).
306. See, e.g., Continuing Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500,§ 114, 100 Stat. 1783 (later reenacted as Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341) (directing the Sec-
retary of Transportation to approve a particular highway project "notwithstanding" law requiring
that projects not be approved until steps taken to minimize environmental damage). A June
1997 Westlaw search of all unannotated state statutes with the query "notwithstanding any other
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sideration of environmental values may be most unpopular (and thus most
important), the unique status of a constitutional provision as fundamental
law enforceable by the courts becomes most useful.
2. The Lack of Constitutional Provisions
The constitutions of at least twenty states, plus Puerto Rico, include
provisions that embody the fundamental commitment to environmental
preservation that can, in turn, serve as the source for this Article's pro-
posed analysis. 0 At least fifteen constitutions either claim some type of
natural resource as the public domain, for reasons other than pure reser-
vation of exploitation rights,3  or restrict or qualify the government's
power to alienate such resources.30 At least ten constitutions include a
pro-conservation policy statement 1 Finally, at least six confer upon their
residents some form of a right to a clean environment.'
Thus, there appears to be significant potential for this Article's analy-
sis to find a basis in American state law. Moreover, the trend toward
adopting such provisions is quite pronounced, and suggests an even greater
potential. For example, every state constitution enacted since 1959 has
included some sort of environmental protection provision.3 2 Adoption of
this Article's proposed analysis may well assist in this trend by increasing
the possibility that a state polity's adoption of such a provision would in133
fact have concrete effects, and would not be merely a symbolic gesture.
provision of law" yielded over 9000 documents. Presumably, at least a significant percentage of
these statutes included this language in order to limit the effect of some preexisting statute.
307. The numbers in this paragraph do not add to 21 because some constitutions have more
than one type of provision.
308. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; WASH.
CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
309. See CAL. CONST. art. X, §§ 2, 4; LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 23;
MASS. CONST. amend. XLIX, § 179; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 20; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
310. See ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST.
art. XIV, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 19; VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
311. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; MASS. CONST. art. XLIX,
§ 179; MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 3; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
312. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 871.
313. For an example of a court dismissing the effect of a constitutional provision as merely
symbolic, see Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988) (construing the
"official English" provision of the California Constitution), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The
possibility for.abuse of the amendment process is suggested by one commentator, writing about
the proposed balanced budget amendment to the federal Constitution. See David E. Kyvig,
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At the very least, basing a public trust analysis on such a provision
increases the legitimacy of such decisions given the classic public trust doc-
trine's substantive haziness and unclear legal foundation.314
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to determine whether the public trust doc-
trine may be justified as another expression of the political-process model
of American constitutional law, whereby heightened judicial scrutiny of
some governmental action is justified as a judicial check on a mal-
functioning political process. The same objection that attends this model
in its original equal protection context-namely, that close judicial scru-
tiny of certain governmental actions requires an embrace of some substan-
tive value-applies equally to the public trust context. Thus, while at
some level of abstraction it might make sense to conceive of public trust
resources as "discrete and insular minorities," that conclusion only post-
pones the question of why courts should care that such resources in fact are
not fully "represented" in the political process.
The reason courts should care is that state polities have expressed a
desire to protect such resources through the adoption of state con-
stitutional provisions reflecting this value. Because resource decision
making is inherently a technical process that requires the balancing of
competing goals, judicial enforcement of these constitutional provisions
must refrain from second-guessing those value balances. Instead, courts
must restrict themselves to ensuring that the government understood and
implemented the polity's concern with environmental conservation, a
methodology quite at home with this Article's advocacy of not just a proc-
ess justification for judicial review, but also a process-based methodology for
implementing such review.
Refining or Resisting Modern Government? The Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
28 AKRON L. REV. 97, 100 (1995) ("The balanced budget campaign displayed... the willingness
of politicians to use the symbol of constitutional change to finesse problems that at the moment
seemed intractable.").
314. See generally Lazarus, supra note 2 (criticizing the modern adoption of the doctrine for
these reasons).
